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INTRODUCTION 
This is a case in which agents of the losing party in an unlawful detainer action 
sued the winning party and its attorneys for more than five million dollars 
($5,000,000.00) simply because the attorneys did their jobs and effectively protected their 
client's interests in accordance with the law. What grievous sin did the attorney 
Defendants commit to warrant such a massive claim? They recorded two lis pendens on 
behalf of their client Parkside, which remained in effect for a mere five months, truthfully 
disclosing that Plaintiffs had pledged their houses as security for a property bond in the 
unlawful detainer action. What do the Plaintiffs contend Defendants should have done 
differently? They literally argue that prior to the recording of the lis pendens, Parkside 
should have sued them in an entirely separate lawsuit seeking to foreclose on the houses 
Plaintiffs had pledged as security. For thus depriving them of the right to be hauled into 
court, Plaintiffs contend, Defendants deserve to have a multi-million-dollar judgment 
entered against them. 
The district court correctly nipped this lawsuit in the bud, dismissing the 
Complaint in its entirety because Plaintiffs' own allegations demonstrate that Defendants 
acted properly in all respects. This Court too should place its stamp of approval on the 
attorney Defendants' thorough and professional legal services to their client by affirming 
the district court's dismissal order. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3)0) (2000). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Appellees offer the following statement of issues in lieu of that contained on pages 
1 and 2 of Appellants' Opening Brief (hereinafter "Br. of Appellants"). This formulation 
of the issues more accurately captures the arguments presented to the district court and 
the basis for the court's decision below. 
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Because this appeal challenges the district court's dismissal of this action under 
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, all of the issues in this appeal are 
legal issues to be reviewed for correctness, considering all Complaint allegations and 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them in a light most favorable to Appellants. 
See, e.g., St. Benedicts' Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) 
(setting forth standard of review for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal). 
ISSUE #1: 
Did the district court correctly dismiss this action in its entirety because the lis 
pendens upon which Plaintiffs based all of their claims were properly filed in an "action 
affecting the title to real property," as permitted under the Utah lis pendens statute? 
Defendants raised this issue before the district court both in their memoranda in 
support of their motion to dismiss (R. 56-59; 245-52) and at oral argument on the motion. 
(R. 306.) 
ISSUE #2: 
Should this Court affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal on the 
alternative ground that the lis pendens upon which Plaintiffs based all of their claims are 
absolutely privileged under Utah law? 
Defendants raised this issue before the district court both in their memoranda in 
support of their motion to dismiss (R. 60-62; 253-56) and at oral argument on the motion. 
(R. 306.) The district court dismissed the Complaint without reaching this issue,1 but this 
Court may nevertheless affirm on this ground because Defendants properly presented it to 
the district court. Salt Lake County v. Bangerter, 928 P.2d 384, 386 (Utah 1996) (holding 
that this Court may affirm a judgment below "on any ground available to the trial court, 
even if it is one not relied on below") (quoting Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 
(Utah 1996)). 
1
 Contrary to the Brief of Appellants, the district court's memorandum decision 
dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint did not reach the absolute privilege issue. (R. 274-81.) 
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ISSUE #3: 
Should this Court affirm the district court's judgment of dismissal on the 
alternative ground that each of the five claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint 
independently fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted? 
Defendants raised this issue before the district court both in their memoranda in 
support of their motion to dismiss (R. 62-66; 258-60) and at oral argument on the motion. 
(R. 306.) The district court dismissed the Complaint without reaching this issue, but this 
Court may nevertheless affirm on this ground because Defendants presented it to the 
district court. Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 386. 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS ON APPEAL 
In addition to the determinative provisions set forth in the Brief of Appellants (Br. 
of Appellants at 2-3), the following statutory provision is of central importance in this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2. Scope. 
(2) The provisions of this chapter [the Wrongful Lien Act] shall not 
prevent a person from filing a lis pendens in accordance with Section 78-
40-2 or seeking any other relief permitted by law. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellees object to Appellants' Statement of the Case (Br. of Appellants at 4-6) 
because it omits or glosses over several factors that are important to the outcome of this 
appeal and because it contains certain erroneous assertions that materially distort the 
record below. Most significantly, Appellants repeatedly intimate in their brief that the lis 
pendens recorded on their houses were gratuitous and unnecessary because the tenant in 
the underlying unlawful detainer action voluntarily satisfied the judgment against it. (Br. 
of Appellants at 5, 7-8, 12.) The record is clear, however, that the tenant did not even 
satisfy the principal component of the judgment until more than two months after the lis 
pendens were recorded. Moreover, Defendant Parkside was forced to garnish the tenant's 
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bank accounts to satisfy the interest, costs, and attorney's fees components of the 
judgment, which garnishment did not occur until after Kasteler's and Daines' counsel had 
prematurely demanded the removal of the lis pendens. Thus, the Brief of Appellants is 
misleading in its suggestion that Defendants insisted on maintaining the lis pendens even 
after the judgment had been satisfied. 
Appellees offer the following Statement of the Case, which more thoroughly 
describes the Complaint allegations and other materials that the district court considered. 
A. Proceedings Below. 
On August 18, 1999, Plaintiffs G. Richard Kasteler ("Kasteler") and Mary L. 
Daines ("Daines") filed a Complaint in the action below against Defendant Parkside Salt 
Lake Corporation ("Parkside") and its attorneys—Defendants Greggory J. Savage 
("Savage") and Matthew N. Evans ("Evans"). (R. 1-25.)2 The Complaint alleged claims 
for "wrongful lien," "slander of title," "quiet title," "intentional infliction of emotional 
distress," and "negligent infliction of emotional distress," based exclusively on two lis 
pendens that Savage and Evans, on behalf of Parkside, filed and recorded on Plaintiffs' 
houses on or about March 30, 1999 (the "Lis Pendens"). Id, In their prayer for relief, 
Plaintiffs sought a judgment of "not less than" six thousand dollars ($6,000.00) in 
damages under the "wrongful lien" statute, fifty thousand dollars ($50,000.00) in 
compensatory damages, five million dollars ($5,000,000.00) in punitive damages, and 
seventy-five thousand dollars ($75,000.00) in costs and attorney's fees. (R. 11-12.) 
On September 9, 1999, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint 
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, asking the district court to 
dismiss the Complaint in its entirety for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be 
granted. (R. 41-43.) In support of their motion, Defendants argued that dismissal was 
2
 Plaintiffs also named Holme Roberts & Owen, the law firm where Savage and 
Evans practice, as a Defendant below. 
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warranted on three separate grounds: (1) the Lis Pendens upon which the entire 
Complaint was based were proper under Utah's lis pendens statute; (2) the Lis Pendens 
were absolutely privileged under the judicial proceeding privilege; and (3) each claim for 
relief was independently defective as a matter of law. (R. 47-144.) 
On November 29, 1999, the district court heard oral argument on Defendants' 
Motion To Dismiss Complaint. (R. 271-72, 306.) 
On January 19, 2000, the district court issued a Memorandum Decision granting 
Defendants' motion on the ground that the Lis Pendens at issue were properly recorded 
under Utah's lis pendens statute and therefore could not subject Defendants to liability 
under any legal theory. (R. 274-81.) A copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached 
hereto as Addendum A. Because this holding disposed of the Complaint in its entirety, 
the Court did not reach the additional, independent grounds for dismissal set forth in 
Defendants' motion and supporting memorandum. (R. 280, Add. A at 7.)3 
On February 7, 2000, the district court entered an Order and Final Judgment, a 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum B, dismissing the action below in its 
entirety. (R. 282-85.) 
On March 8, 2000, Plaintiffs filed a Notice of Appeal to this Court. (R. 293-95.) 
B. Statement of Facts. 
On July 17, 1998, Defendant Parkside filed an unlawful detainer action against its 
commercial tenant Insure-Rite, Inc. (hereinafter the "Unlawful Detainer Action"), 
alleging that Insure-Rite had unlawfully failed to vacate certain business premises owned 
3
 As noted above, contrary to assertions in the Brief of Appellants, the district 
court did not reach the "absolute privilege" issue in its Memorandum Decision. 
However, absolute privilege provides a valid alternative basis for the district court's 
dismissal order, and the issue is therefore properly before this Court for consideration. 
Bangerter, 928 P.2d at 386 (holding that this Court may affirm a judgment below "on any 
ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not relied on below"). 
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by Parkside, which are located at 215 South State Street, Suite 401, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111-2354. (R.2-3at1[5.)4 
Defendants Savage and Evans, attorneys practicing in the law firm of Holme 
Roberts & Owen ("HRO"; also a Defendant below), were counsel for Parkside in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action. (R. 3 at ffl[ 7-8.) 
On August 13, 1998, the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action entered an order 
requiring Insure-Rite to post a counter-possession bond in the form of a property bond, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b), as security for the costs and actual 
damages that Parkside would be entitled to recover if it prevailed in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action. (R. 99-100.) A copy of this order is attached hereto as Addendum C.5 
Insure-Rite was required to post such a bond in order to remain in possession of the 
premises until the conclusion of the Unlawful Detainer Action. (Br. of Appellants at 4.) 
Also on August 13, 1998, Plaintiffs Kasteler and Daines satisfied Insure-Rite's 
security obligations by posting a "Renter's Counter Bond" on behalf of Insure-Rite with 
the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action (R. 188-94), which bond pledged Kasteler's 
and Daines' houses as security as follows: 
This property bond represents security posted with the Court by the 
Renter, Defendant, as the probable amount of costs of suit and actual 
damages that may result to the Owner (Plaintiff) if Plaintiff [sic] has 
4
 Parkside filed the Unlawful Detainer Action, entitled Parkside Salt Lake 
Corporation v. Insure-Rite, Inc., Civil No. 98 090 6982, in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. (R. 93-97.) 
5
 Because this order is an item of public record, it was appropriate for the district 
court to consider it in connection with Defendants' motion to dismiss without converting 
the motion to a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. See Alvarez v. Galetka, 933 P.2d 
987, 990 n.6 (Utah 1997) (noting that "items attached to pleadings, items of public record, 
and items in trial record will not convert 12(b)(6) motion to rule 56 motion for summary 
judgment") (citing 2A James Wm. Moore et al., Moore's Federal Practice f 12.07 (2d ed. 
1996)). The same is true with respect to several other items of public record that the 
parties presented without objection to the district court, many of which are attached 
hereto as addenda. There is no contention to the contrary in the Brief of Appellants. 
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improperly withheld possession of the premises located at: 215 SOUTH 
STATE STREET SUITE 401, SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 84111-2354. 
PROPERTY BOND 
We the undersigned, G. Richard Kasteler, and Mary L. Daines, are 
residents of Salt Lake and Davis County, respectively, State of Utah, and 
we each own property in the State of Utah. We jointly and severally 
undertake the obligation of this bond in the sum of $25,000.00, and we shall 
pay all costs ana damages which may be awarded to the Owner, not 
exceeding the sum undertaken. We state that each of us has a net worth, 
above debts, more than the sum undertaken, and we pledge the property 
listed herein as security in the above entitled action. 
(R. 188-89, emphasis added.) A copy of this bond is attached hereto as Addendum D. 
The parcels of property pledged in Kasteler's and Daines' Renter's Counter Bond were 
Kasteler's house at 6278 South Granada Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah, and Daines' house 
at 1210 Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah. (R. 190-91; Add. D at 3-4.) 
On November 30, 1998, the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action granted partial 
summary judgment in favor of Parkside on Parkside's principal claim—holding that 
Insure-Rite was "in unlawful detainer of the premises leased from" Parkside—and 
entered an Order of Restitution directing Insure-Rite promptly to vacate the leased 
premises. (R. 110-13.) 
On March 15, 1999, the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action entered an order 
granting summary judgment in favor of Parkside on the issue of damages and ordering 
Insure-Rite to pay Parkside a damage award of $108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees, 
and costs. (R. 115-16.) 
Approximately two weeks later, on or about March 30, 1999, Savage and Evans, in 
their capacity as counsel for Parkside, and in an effort to protect Parkside's security for its 
judgment against Insure-Rite, filed for recordation in the Salt Lake County Recorder's 
Office two lis pendens (the "Lis Pendens") bearing the caption of the Unlawful Detainer 
Action. (R. 3-4 at ffl[ 9-10, 14-17, 20-23.) Copies of the two Lis Pendens (R. 14-17; 20-
23) are attached hereto as Addenda E and F. One of the Lis Pendens was recorded on 
Kasteler's house, (R. 14-17; Add. E), and the other was recorded on Daines' house. (R. 
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20-23; Add. F.) Except for the fact that the two Lis Pendens had different property 
descriptions attached to them, they were identical to one another in form and content. 
Each Lis Pendens stated in full as follows: 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action 
concerning title to certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, that is more particularly described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-36-8.5 the Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession 
property bond and filed as security for the property bond the property 
described in Exhibit "A". On November 30, 1998, the Court determined 
that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises 
and has since awarded money damages in the amount of $108,417.24, plus 
interest, attorney's fees and costs to the Plaintiff. Plaintiff therefore may 
satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the property described in Exhibit 
"A". 
(R. 14-15, 20-21; Add. E at 1-2; Add. F at 1-2.) 
Although HRO, on behalf of Parkside, could have immediately foreclosed on 
Kasteler's and Daines' houses at that point to satisfy part of Parkside's judgment against 
Insure-Rite, it instead elected to spare Kasteler and Daines that unpleasant experience and 
sought to satisfy the judgment through other means. First, Parkside allowed Insure-Rite 
time to make a voluntary payment. On or about June 4, 1999, over two months after the 
recording of the Lis Pendens, Insure-Rite made a payment of $108,417.24 in satisfaction 
of the principal amount of the judgment. (R. 118-20.) HRO, on behalf of Parkside, filed 
a Partial Satisfaction of Judgment acknowledging that payment, but it expressly reserved 
Parkside's "right to collect reasonable attorneys' fees, court costs and interest which the 
Court ha[d] awarded to Parkside. . . ." (R. 119.) A copy of this Partial Satisfaction of 
Judgment is attached hereto as Addendum G. 
On August 17, 1999, despite the fact that Insure-Rite had satisfied only the 
principal component of Parkside's judgment, counsel for Kasteler and Daines mailed a 
letter to all of the Defendants demanding immediate removal of the Lis Pendens. (R. 206; 
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Br. of Appellants at 5.)6 Savage replied to that letter on August 20, 1999, reminding 
counsel that Kasteler and Daines had pledged their houses as security for the judgment 
against Insure-Rite, that they had never requested the court in the Unlawful Detainer 
Action to release their houses as security, and that the judgment remained unsatisfied. (R. 
221; Br. of Appellants at Ex. 4.) Savage's letter closed by stating that the Lis Pendens 
were proper and would not be removed, but it invited Kasteler's and Daines' counsel to 
"address this matter to the Court" in the Unlawful Detainer Action if he disagreed. Id.7 
Insure-Rite never voluntarily satisfied the interest, costs, or attorney's fees portions 
of Parkside's judgment. Instead, Defendants were forced to garnish Insure-Rite's bank 
accounts on June 30, 1999, to obtain additional funds for Parkside representing interest, 
costs, and attorney's fees. (R. 122-25, 127-30.) Copies of these writs of garnishment are 
attached hereto as Addenda H and I. Only on August 30, 1999 was Parkside able to 
acknowledge full satisfaction by Insure-Rite of the court's judgment in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action, including interest and all court-awarded attorney's fees and costs 
incurred by Parkside up to and including April 30, 1999. (R. 132-34.)8 
6
 As stated above, the Brief of Appellants misleadingly suggests that Insure-Rite 
had satisfied the judgment in full when Kasteler's and Daines' counsel demanded the 
removal of the Lis Pendens. (Br. of Appellants at 5, 7-8, 12.) The record is clear, 
however, that significant portions of the judgment remained unsatisfied at that time. 
7
 Although Plaintiffs make much of this correspondence in their Brief of 
Appellants, (Br. of Appellants at 5-6), the record is clear that Plaintiffs never intended to 
give Defendants a meaningful opportunity to respond to their counsel's August 17 letter 
or to address the propriety of the Lis Pendens with the court in the Unlawful Detainer 
Action. Plaintiffs' counsel sent the August 17 letter to Defendants by regular mail. (R. 
206.) Accordingly, the letter was not received until August 19, and Savage was not able 
to send his response until August 20. (R. 221; Br. of Appellants at Ex. 4.) By then, 
however, Plaintiffs had already filed their Complaint in this case on August 18, 1999 (R. 
1-25), only one day after their counsel had mailed the August 17 letter to Defendants. 
8
 Parkside again reserved its right to collect reasonable attorney's fees and costs 
incurred after April 30, 1999. (R. 133.) 
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Because Parkside had received payment for almost all of the total judgment in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action, as described above, Savage and Evans Defendants filed 
documents with the Salt Lake County Recorder on September 1, 1999, releasing the Lis 
Pendens on Kasteler's and Daines' houses. (R. 136-39, 141-44.) Copies of these releases 
are attached hereto as Addenda J and K. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This case is not, as Plaintiffs suggest, a complicated academic balancing act 
involving the policies and common-law traditions of "[l]andlord-tenant law, surety law 
and lien law." (Br. of Appellants at 7.) Nor does this case present the question of 
whether landlords may employ "self-help" rather than valid legal process in unlawful 
detainer cases. (Br. of Appellants at 8.) Rather, this case presents the simple question of 
whether people who voluntarily encumber their houses with a property bond may assert 
multi-million-dollar tort claims against the bond creditors and their lawyers merely for 
informing potential home purchasers, through entirely truthful lis pendens, that the bond 
exists. 
The answer to this question, as the district court correctly concluded, is a 
resounding no.9 It is certainly true that Kasteler and Daines would have encountered 
difficulty had they attempted to sell their houses during the five-month period that the Lis 
Pendens were in effect; in other words, Plaintiffs are correct that prospective purchasers 
or lenders would be reluctant to "buy a pig in a poke" by acquiring a properly interest that 
is subject in part to the outcome of a lawsuit. (Br. of Appellants at 8.) But that is exactly 
the point of the property bond that Kasteler and Daines deliberately executed. They are 
the ones who placed the "pig in the poke" and impaired the marketability of their houses 
9
 At no point in this lawsuit, either at the district court level or in their Brief of 
Appellants, have Plaintiffs cited a single case in which any bond creditor has ever been 
held liable on any legal theory for recording a lis pendens against property pledged as 
security for the bond. 
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by pledging them as security in the Unlawful Detainer Action. At the moment they 
executed their "Renter's Counter Bond" (R. 188-94; Add. D), Kasteler and Daines 
relinquished the right to sell or encumber their houses without giving priority to the bond. 
Had they attempted to do so (and there is no allegation in the Complaint that they did), 
they would have been in contempt of court in the Unlawful Detainer Action. The Lis 
Pendens at issue in this case did not create that problem for Plaintiffs; Plaintiffs created it 
for themselves. The Lis Pendens merely gave teeth to Plaintiffs' security obligations by 
ensuring that no bona fide purchaser could impair Parkside's security if Kasteler and 
Daines attempted to thumb their noses at the Unlawful Detainer court by selling their 
houses out from under the bond. 
Preventing such mischief is consistent with the best traditions of the lis pendens 
doctrine, and there are multiple reasons why the district court was correct to halt 
Plaintiffs' entire lawsuit in the starting gates. Defendants presented the district court with 
numerous independent grounds for dismissing Plaintiffs' Complaint. Any one of these 
grounds, standing alone, would require affirmance of the district court's dismissal order. 
Together, they impose an insurmountable barrier to Plaintiffs' claims on appeal. 
ISSUE #1: First, the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs' entire 
Complaint because the Lis Pendens were proper under Utah's lis pendens statute. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' central argument, Defendants could have enforced Kasteler's and 
Daines' property bond in the Unlawful Detainer Action itself, without having to sue them 
in an independent enforcement action. By filing their bond, Kasteler and Daines 
essentially surrendered their houses to the jurisdiction of the court in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action, which therefore had the power to enforce the bond without the necessity 
of a separate action. Moreover, Kasteler and Daines made a general appearance in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action when they filed their bond, thus empowering the court to 
enforce the bond according to its terms. The Unlawful Detainer Action therefore 
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"affected title" to Kasteler's and Daines' houses within the meaning of the lis pendens 
statute, and the Lis Pendens were proper. 
Moreover, even if a separate enforcement action were required (which it was not), 
the Unlawful Detainer Action still "affected title" to Kasteler's and Daines' homes. It 
was the Unlawful Detainer Action alone that determined Kasteler's and Daines' liability 
on their bond. Any subsequent enforcement action would have been nothing more than a 
straightforward application of res judicata to which Kasteler and Daines would have had 
no defenses. Because the Unlawful Detainer Action would have been utterly dispositive 
in such an enforcement action, the Unlawful Detainer Action "affected title" to Kasteler's 
and Daines' houses under Utah law even if a separate enforcement action were required. 
The Lis Pendens were therefore proper, and Plaintiffs' lawsuit was correctly dismissed. 
ISSUE #2: Entirely apart from whether the Lis Pendens conformed to the 
requirements of the statute, the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint was correct because the 
Lis Pendens are absolutely privileged under the judicial proceeding privilege. This Court, 
like the courts of most jurisdictions, has held that lis pendens enjoy the protection of the 
absolute judicial proceeding privilege. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, that rule of law 
has not been supplanted or superseded in any way. Moreover, this Court has repeatedly 
held that statements within the judicial proceeding privilege are absolutely privileged not 
only against defamation claims, but against all claims of liability. It was therefore 
appropriate that the district court dismissed this action in its entirety. 
ISSUE #3: Finally, the district court's dismissal order was correct because each 
individual claim in Plaintiffs' Complaint independently fails for a variety of reasons. 
Plaintiffs' principal claim—their "wrongful lien" claim—fails for the fundamental reason 
that lis pendens simply are not liens. It is well settled that lis pendens merely describe 
encumbrances on property; they are not encumbrances themselves. Accordingly, the 
wrongful lien statute expressly excludes lis pendens from the scope of its coverage. The 
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"lien" at issue in this case is the property bond that Kasteler and Daines chose to execute; 
it is not the Lis Pendens, which merely gave notice of the bond. 
Plaintiffs' "slander of title" claim fails because the Lis Pendens were truthful in all 
respects, and Plaintiffs do not contend otherwise. The claim also fails because Plaintiffs 
have not alleged special damages in the form of a lost sales opportunity, as required to 
state a claim for slander of title. Nor could Plaintiffs allege special damages. Any such 
allegation would be an outright concession that Kasteler and Daines acted in contempt of 
the Unlawful Detainer court by attempting to sell their houses out from under the bond. 
Plaintiffs' remaining claims are similarly defective. The "quiet title" claim is moot 
because Defendants released the Lis Pendens on September 1, 1999; the "intentional 
infliction of emotional distress" claim fails because Defendants' alleged conduct is 
insufficiently "outrageous" as a matter of law; and the "negligent infliction of emotional 
distress" claim fails because it omits essential elements of such a claim. 
Even when examined individually, none of Plaintiffs' legal theories states a valid 
claim for relief. This provides yet another ground upon which this Court should affirm 
the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
ARGUMENT 
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
The propriety of the district court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint under Utah 
R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) is a question of law that this Court should review for correctness. See 
Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263, 264 (Utah 1995); St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991). This Court should affirm the district 
court's dismissal if the facts alleged in Plaintiffs' Complaint, when assumed to be true, 
fail to provide any valid basis for the relief requested. Id. See also Whipple v. Am. Fork 
Irrigation Co., 910 P.2d 1218, 1220 (Utah 1996) (stating that dismissal is justified "when 
the allegations of the complaint clearly demonstrate that the plaintiff does not have a 
claim"). When reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, this Court "recite[s] the facts in the 
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light most favorable to the losing party below." Sperry v. Sperry, 1999 UT 101, U 2, 990 
P.2d 381. In keeping with this standard, the foregoing Statement of Facts is drawn from 
the face of Plaintiffs' Complaint and appropriate items of public record, with all doubts 
resolved in Plaintiffs' favor.10 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED THIS ACTION IN 
ITS ENTIRETY ON THE GROUND THAT THE LIS PENDENS AT ISSUE 
WERE PROPER UNDER THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE AND CANNOT 
SUBJECT DEFENDANTS TO LIABILITY. 
All of Plaintiffs' claims fail in this case because each is premised upon an 
act—Defendants' filing of the Lis Pendens—that Defendants were expressly permitted to 
perform under Utah statute. Utah's lis pendens statute provides in pertinent part that: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the right of possession of, real 
property the plaintiff at the time of tiling the complaint or thereafter, and 
the defendant at the time of filing his answer when affirmative relief is 
claimed in such answer, or at any time afterward, may file for record . . . a 
notice of the pendency of the action . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 (1996) (emphasis added). In interpreting this statute, this 
Court has broadly observed that "a notice of lis pendens may be filed with respect to 
property whose title would be affected by pending judicial action." Boyce v. Boyce, 609 
P.2d 928, 932 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added). The question of whether a lis pendens has 
been properly filed is a question of law for the Court to decide. Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 
P.2d 1381, 1392 (Utah 1996).11 
Defendants recognize that this Court must, for the purpose of this appeal, accept 
as true all factual allegations asserted in the Complaint. However, Defendants do not 
stipulate to these facts for any other purpose, and if there are further proceedings in this 
matter, Defendants fully reserve the right to present a factual defense and controvert the 
Complaint allegations where appropriate. 
11
 Throughout the Brief of Appellants, Plaintiffs mistakenly discuss their 
interpretation of the lis pendens statute only within the analytical framework of the 
"wrongful lien" statute, which Plaintiffs erroneously contend requires lis pendens to be 
"expressly authorized" by the "plain language" of the lis pendens statute in order to avoid 
being categorized as wrongful liens. This faulty analytical approach is a red herring that 
should not distract this Court. Because lis pendens simply are not liens, and are in fact 
expressly excluded from the scope of the wrongful lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-
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At the heart of this case is a procedural issue that Plaintiffs incorrectly believe 
invalidates the Lis Pendens at issue in this case under the terms of the lis pendens statute. 
Through what can best be described as a plea for this Court to exalt form over substance, 
Plaintiffs surprisingly contend that Defendants tortiously violated their rights by failing to 
file a lawsuit against them seeking to foreclose on their houses. Plaintiffs' argument, in 
their own words, is that "the landlord first should have filed an independent enforcement 
action against [Kasteler and Daines] on their bond as required by Utah statute and 
common law, and only thereafter, could the landlord have recorded lis pendens on 
Appellants' homes." (Br. of Appellants at 12 (emphasis in original).) That assertion is 
quite clearly the "linchpin" of Plaintiffs' argument on appeal.12 
All of Plaintiffs' claims arise from the Lis Pendens that Defendants recorded on 
their houses. Yet Plaintiffs do not and cannot contend that their houses were entitled to 
be free from lis pendens. They merely assert that Defendants made a procedural error by 
failing to sue them prior to recording the Lis Pendens. In other words, Kasteler and 
Daines literally argue as the basis for their multi-million-dollar lawsuit that Defendants 
deprived them of their alleged right to be hauled into court in addition to having lis 
pendens recorded on their houses. As they admit in their brief, "if the Appellees herein 
had filed an action against the Appellants-sureties on their bond first, and thereafter 
recorded the lis pendens involved, Appellants' lawsuit would not have resulted." (Br. of 
Appellants at 30 (emphasis in original).) 
2(2) (1997), it would be inappropriate for this Court to interpret the lis pendens statute 
through the lens of the wrongful lien statute. Instead, this Court should simply interpret 
and apply the lis pendens statute directly, as it always has. If the Lis Pendens at issue in 
this case were proper under this Court's interpretation of the lis pendens statute, then they 
certainly cannot constitute "wrongful liens" or support any of Plaintiffs' claims in this 
case. Even Plaintiffs cannot seriously contend that lis pendens can be actionable as 
wrongful liens despite satisfying the requirements of the lis pendens statute as properly 
interpreted by this Court. 
Plaintiffs emphasize the alleged requirement of an independent action no fewer 
than eleven times in their brief. (Br. of Appellants at 5, 7-12, 24-25, 30.) 
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Why do Plaintiffs believe this makes a difference? Because they concede that if 
Utah law permitted Defendants to enforce Plaintiffs' property bond in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action itself, rather than requiring an independent action on the bond, then the 
Unlawful Detainer Action would "affect title" to Plaintiffs' houses and would justify 
recording the Lis Pendens under Utah Code Ann. section 78-40-2, If the Lis Pendens 
were proper under the statute, even Plaintiffs themselves acknowledge that their "lawsuit 
would not have resulted." (Br. of Appellants at 30.) Plaintiffs argue, however, that an 
independent action is required to enforce a tenant's counter bond because Utah's 
possession-bond statute, Utah Code Ann. section 78-36-8.5(2)(b) (1996), does not 
expressly state that an independent action is unnecessary. (Br. of Appellants at 24-25.) If 
that "linchpin" proposition is incorrect, however, and a tenant's counter bond can be 
enforced in an unlawful detainer action, then all of Plaintiffs' claims fail under the weight 
of Plaintiffs' own arguments.13 
A. The Linchpin of Plaintiffs' Argument Fails Because Defendants Could 
Have Enforced Plaintiffs' Surety Bonds in the Unlawful Detainer Action. 
Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, a tenant's counter bond can be enforced against 
the sureties who post it in the very same action in which it is posted. The district court 
correctly applied this rule of law as support for its dismissal order below, and Defendants 
respectfully invite this Court's attention to the district court's carefully reasoned 
Memorandum Decision. (R. 274-81; Add. A.) 
The law does not require the cumbersome, inefficient waste of judicial resources 
that would accompany the requirement of an independent action. In arguing otherwise, 
Plaintiffs cite a handful of statutes and procedural rules addressing various types of bonds 
and note that many of these statutes and rules expressly state that "[t]he surety's liability 
13
 The converse is not true. Even if an independent action were necessary to 
enforce a tenant's counter bond, Plaintiffs' claims would still all fail as a matter of law for 
the many reasons set forth below. This linchpin is critical to Plaintiffs' case only; not to 
Defendants'. 
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[on the bond] may be enforced on motion without the necessity of an independent 
action." (Br. of Appellants at 24-25.) Plaintiffs argue that because these magic words are 
not present in the possession-bond statute, the "default" rule strips the court of 
jurisdiction over the sureties and requires an entirely separate lawsuit to enforce a tenant's 
counter bond. Id. 
What Plaintiffs fail to observe, however, is that the possession-bond statute 
provides an even stronger jurisdictional basis for the court in an unlawful detainer action 
to enforce a counter bond against the surety by requiring that "[t]he bond shall be payable 
to the clerk of the court." Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 (2)(b) (1996) (emphasis added). 
Rather than merely requiring sureties to submit personally to the jurisdiction of the court 
for enforcement purposes, as other bond statutes and rules do, the possession-bond statute 
goes one step further and ensures that the court will have jurisdiction to enforce a bond by 
essentially requiring the sureties to surrender to the court any money or property pledged 
as security. This unquestionably provides the court in the unlawful detainer action with 
jurisdiction to enforce the bond against the surety immediately.14 If that were not the 
case, it would be impossible for the court to order "immediate" execution on an unlawful 
detainer judgment—a procedure that the unlawful detainer statutes expressly require. See 
14
 Rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure further supports the proposition 
that requiring security to be deposited with the court is an alternative method by which a 
court can acquire jurisdiction to enforce an undertaking. Rule 62(d) allows a party to 
obtain a stay delaying execution on a money judgment pending appeal by "giving a 
supersedeas bond." When such a bond is given, it must "provide that each surety submits 
to the jurisdiction of the court . . . and that the surety's liability may be enforced on 
motion and upon such notice as the court may require without the necessity of an 
independent action." Utah R. Civ. P. 62(i)(4). As an alternative to requiring such a bond, 
however, Rule 62 allows the court to "permit a deposit of money in court or other security 
to be given in lieu of giving a supersedeas bond . . . ." Utah R. Civ. P. 62(i)(2). The rule 
contains no language expressly granting the court jurisdiction to execute on security 
deposited in court. As with the possession-bond statute, such language is unnecessary 
because the court obviously has jurisdiction over property that has been relinquished to it 
as security. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4) (1996) (requiring that "execution upon the [unlawful 
detainer] judgment shall be issued immediately after the entry of the judgment. In all 
cases, the judgment may be issued and enforced immediately.") (emphasis added). The 
district court expressly adopted this line of reasoning (R. 274-81; Add. A), and Plaintiffs 
have offered no explanation, other than ipse dixit assertions, of why it is incorrect. 
The property bond that Kasteler and Daines posted in the Unlawful Detainer 
Action satisfied the requirements of the possession-bond statute, and the bond could have 
been enforced against them in that very action. The bond, which both Kasteler and 
Daines signed, designated their houses as "security posted with the Court" in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action. (R. 188; Add. D at 1 (emphasis added).) The bond contained 
the caption of the Unlawful Detainer Action and was filed in the Unlawful Detainer 
Action. Id. Thus, in accordance with the requirements of the possession-bond statute, 
and through the unambiguous language of the bond itself, Kasteler and Daines essentially 
surrendered their houses to the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action as security for their 
undertaking to "pay all costs and damages which may be awarded to the Owner" in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action up to the amount of $25,000. (R. 188-89; Add. D at 1-2.) By 
thus voluntarily appearing and pledging 1heir houses as security in the Unlawful Detainer 
Action, Kasteler and Daines submitted themselves and their houses to the jurisdiction of 
the court, which could accordingly enforce the bond. No "independent enforcement 
action" was necessary. 
Indeed, under Utah case law, even if the language of the possession-bond statute 
did not operate to subject Kasteler's and Daines' houses to the control of the court in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action, their act of filing the bond in the Unlawful Detainer Action 
nevertheless constituted a "general appearance" in that action sufficient to vest the court 
with jurisdiction to enforce the bond. In Fitzgerald v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah 
App. 1987), the defendant obtained a discharge of a prejudgment attachment on certain 
livestock by furnishing an attachment bond in the form of an undertaking by a surety as 
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required by Utah R. Civ. P. 64C(g). Id. at 305. Contrary to the requirements of the rule, 
the bond did not expressly provide that the surety submitted itself to the jurisdiction of the 
court for the purpose of enforcing the bond. Id Nevertheless, following an order to show 
cause hearing on the surety's failure to pay on the bond, the trial court ruled that the bond 
was intended to guarantee any judgment against the defendant. IdL 
The Court of Appeals in Fitzgerald concluded that although the bond did not 
contain the precise language submitting the surety to the jurisdiction of the court, the 
bond would nevertheless "be enforced according to the terms of the authorizing rule." Id. 
More importantly, the appellate court stated as an alternative basis for affirming the trial 
court that the surety had "made a general appearance at the show cause hearing, thereby 
submitting itself to the court's jurisdiction to enforce payment on its undertaking." Id. 
(emphasis added).15 Under Utah law, an appearance in court "for any purpose except a 
special appearance to object to jurisdiction over [one's] person constitutes a general 
appearance." Barber v. Calder, 522 P.2d 700, 702 n.4 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added). 
Although the Fitzgerald court specifically held that the surety in question had made a 
general appearance at a show cause hearing, courts from other jurisdictions have held that 
the posting of a surety bond itself constitutes a general appearance. See, e.g., Hensley 
et al. v. Minehan, 29 Ga. App. 251, 114 S.E. 647 (1922) (approving trial court's judgment 
on a bond "against both principal and his surety" because "both [the principal] and his 
Plaintiffs argue that the Fitzgerald case is inapposite because it involves Utah 
Rule of Civil Procedure 64C, which expressly provides for the enforcement of bonds 
without the necessity of independent actions. (Br. of Appellants at 23 n.5.) However, the 
significance of the Fitzgerald decision in this case is not its analysis of Rule 64C, but 
rather its alternative holding that the bond surety had made a general appearance. This 
aspect of the Fitzgerald decision is directly on point in this case, and Plaintiffs have not 
addressed it at all. 
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surety have voluntarily appeared in the proceedings by filing a replevy bond for the 
property levied on under the attachment").16 
In light of the above authority, Kasteler and Daines entered a "general appearance" 
in the Unlawful Detainer Action when they voluntarily signed and filed the property bond 
with the court in that action.17 Under the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Fitzgerald, 
this general appearance gave the court jurisdiction to enforce the bond against Kasteler 
and Daines in the Unlawful Detainer Action.18 Contrary to the "linchpin" of Plaintiffs' 
argument in this case, the Unlawful Detainer Action did "affect title" to Kasteler's and 
Daines' houses, and the Lis Pendens recorded by Defendants were entirely proper under 
the Utah statute. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim that they were tortiously deprived of the 
16
 See also Yale v. Nat'l Indem. Co., 602 F.2d 642, 645 ( 4 * Cir. 1979) (posting a 
surety bond constitutes a "general appearance"); Ashmus v. Donohoe, 272 Wis. 234, 236-
37, 75 N.W.2d 303, 304-05 (1956) (filing of a surety bond "amounted to a general 
appearance and gave the court jurisdiction for all purposes"). 
17
 This distinguishes Kasteler's and Daines' situation from that of the injunction 
bond surety in the Junction Irrigation case, which is the case cited by Plaintiffs as support 
for the so-called "general rule" requiring an independent action. (Br. of Appellants at 
24.) In Junction Irrigation, which has since been legislatively overruled, this Court held 
that under the circumstances of the case, a party who had been wrongfully enjoined was 
required to pursue an independent action to enforce an injunction bond posted by the 
other party. Junction Irrigation Co. v. Snow, 118 P.2d 130, 131-32 (Utah 1941). In that 
case, however, there was no indication that the surety on the injunction bond had itself 
filed any document with the court or had otherwise appeared before the court in any 
capacity. Kasteler and Daines, by contrast, signed and filed a document in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action voluntarily submitting themselves and their houses to the jurisdiction of 
the court. 
18
 Although the district court expressly adopted this line of reasoning and 
concluded that Kasteler and Daines had entered a general appearance in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action by filing their bond (R. 279-80; Add. A at 6-7), there is no mention of the 
"general appearance" issue anywhere in the Brief of Appellants. This "general 
appearance" analysis is an entirely independent basis for concluding that a separate 
enforcement action was not required. Therefore, Plaintiffs have completely failed to 
address an issue that is sufficient in and of itself to require affirmance of the district 
court's dismissal order. 
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privilege of being sued in an independent action has no basis in law and should be 
rejected by this Court. 
B. Even if Defendants Should Have Filed an Independent Action To Enforce 
the Bonds, the Unlawful Detainer Action Still "Affected Title" to Plaintiffs' 
Houses, and the Lis Pendens Were Therefore Proper. 
The Lis Pendens at issue in this case were proper under Utah's lis pendens statute 
even if independent actions are necessary to enforce counter bonds under the unlawful 
detainer statute. As noted above, this Court has held that under the lis pendens statute, "a 
notice of lis pendens may be recorded with respect to property whose title would be 
affected by pending judicial action." Boyce, 609 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added). By 
pledging their houses as security in the Unlawful Detainer Action, Kasteler and Daines 
unquestionably created a situation where title to their houses "would be affected" by that 
action in a direct and palpable fashion, regardless of the technical necessity of an 
independent enforcement action. 
This is so because the outcome of the Unlawful Detainer Action would have 
completely and irrefutably dictated the result of the enforcement action.19 The only 
condition necessary to trigger Kasteler5s and Daines' liability on their bond was an award 
of costs or damages in favor of the owner in the Unlawful Detainer Action. (R. 189; Add. 
D at 2.) Once such a judgment was entered in the Unlawful Detainer Action, the die was 
cast. That judgment would have been res judicata in any subsequent action to execute on 
Kasteler's and Daines5 houses, and they would accordingly have had no defense in such 
an action. Thus, the Unlawful Detainer Action plainly "affected title" to Kasteler's and 
19
 This is yet another reason why it would be an indefensible waste of resources to 
require entirely separate lawsuits to enforce counter bonds filed in unlawful detainer 
actions. Because the surety's liability on the bond is a foregone conclusion once the 
unlawful detainer action has been litigated to final judgment, the only thing a separate 
enforcement action would accomplish would be the unnecessary expenditure of additional 
time and resources by the courts and the parties. 
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Dames' houses within the meaning of the lis pendens statute. Utah Code Ann. § 78-40-2 
(1996). 
Plaintiffs seek to sidestep this unavoidable conclusion by asserting that the lis 
pendens statute forbids the recording of lis pendens if an action's "effect" on title to real 
property occurs anywhere outside the strict confines of the action itself. (Br. of 
Appellants at 19-21.) As Plaintiffs state their argument, the lis pendens statute "plainly 
and closely ties 'the action' to 'the property' upon which the lis pendens is recorded. . . . 
Nowhere in the Unlawful Detainer complaint (R. 98-97) is there any mention of the 
homes of Appellants Mr. Kasteler and Ms. Daines, and the lis pendens therefore were 
invalid." Id. at 19 (emphasis in original).20 
This Court recently rejected such a narrow construction of the lis pendens statute 
in the case of Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381 (Utah 1996). Although Plaintiffs cite 
Timm in their Brief of Appellants (Br. of Appellants at 19-20), the case in fact strongly 
supports the proposition that an action can "affect title" to real property within the 
meaning of Utah's lis pendens statute even if the effect will occur outside the strict 
parameters of the action itself. In Timm, the defendants had borrowed money from the 
plaintiffs and had pledged certain parcels of real property as security for the loan, one of 
which—the "trust deed property"—was secured by a deed of trust. Id. at 1383-84. The 
defendant borrowers defaulted on the loan, and the lenders filed a complaint against them 
seeking to recover the unpaid balance of the loan. Id. at 1384. As part of the action, the 
Far more glaring is Plaintiffs' omission from their Complaint in this action of 
any mention of their property bond. (R. 1-24.) Nowhere in their Complaint do Plaintiffs 
even hint that they had voluntarily pledged their houses as security in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action long before the Defendants recorded the Lis Pendens at issue. Standing 
by itself, the Complaint creates the impression that Kasteler and Daines had no 
involvement of any kind in the Unlawful Detainer Action aind that Defendants 
gratuitously recorded Lis Pendens on their houses for no reason at all. The best that can 
be said of this omission by Plaintiffs is that it renders their Complaint extraordinarily 
misleading. 
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lenders sought to determine their respective rights and priorities with respect to some of 
the property that the borrowers had pledged as security, but not the trust deed property. 
Id. Instead of including the trust deed property as part of the action, the lenders intended 
to conduct a separate non-judicial trust deed sale of the property. Id. The borrowers 
responded by filing a lis pendens on the trust deed property that referred to the lenders' 
action involving the loan default and the other pieces of property. Id. at 1392. On the 
lenders' motion, the trial court released the borrowers' lis pendens. Id. 
On appeal, this Court reversed. Like Plaintiffs in this case, the lenders in Timm 
argued on appeal that title to the trust deed property "was not the subject of [their] 
litigation" against the borrowers and that the court had therefore properly released the lis 
pendens. Id at 1392. In response, the borrowers argued "that the trust deed property is 
affected by the outcome of [the] litigation and therefore the lis pendens should not have 
been released." Id. (emphasis added). This Court held for the borrowers, noting that 
because their "interest in the trust deed property is subject to the outcome of [the] case," 
the trial court had erred in releasing the lis pendens, despite the fact that title to the trust 
deed property would be affected in the context of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. Id at 
1393. Under the same reasoning, the Lis Pendens at issue in this case were proper 
because title to Kasteler's and Daines' houses was "subject to the outcome" of the 
Unlawful Detainer Action, even if the effect would technically be felt in a separate 
enforcement action.21 
This Court should not be misled by Plaintiffs' attempt to turn the Timm case to 
their advantage by seizing on the irrelevant "amended counterclaim" issue. (Br. of 
Appellants at 20.) The material factors in the Timm "action" are not complicated. 
Simply put, lenders were seeking to recover money they claimed was due under 
promissory notes. The borrower asserted that the promissory notes were paid in foil. The 
resolution of whether the promissory notes had been paid in foil would determine whether 
the lenders' planned nonjudicial foreclosure sale oi the borrowers' trust deed property 
would be proper. That alone was the Court's stated basis for holding that the borrowers' 
lis pendens on the trust deed property was appropriate: "If the trial court finds on remand 
that [the borrowers] had paid the amounts owed on the promissory notes in foil, then the 
lenders' [nonjudicial] foreclosure on the Dewsnups' property, including the trust deed 
property, would be in error. Thus Mr. Dewsnup's interest in the trust deed property is 
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Any other result would severely undermine the fundamental purpose of the lis 
pendens doctrine and wreak havoc on the rights of litigants in unlawful detainer actions. 
As this Court has observed: 
The doctrine of lis pendens preserves the status quo by keeping the subject 
of the lawsuit within the power and control of the court until judgment or 
decree shall be entered. 1 he recording ot a lis pendens serves as a warning 
to all persons that any rights or interests they may acquire in the interim are 
subject to the judgment or decree. 
Tuft v. Fed. Leasing, 657 P.2d 1300, 1302 (Utah 1982) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Bagnall v. Suburbia Land Co., 579 P.2d 914, 916 (Utah 1978)). This doctrine is 
indispensable in preventing the temptation toward "mischief that would otherwise beset 
parties to hotly contested litigation in which title to property is at issue: 
The mischief that would follow if the parties to an action under such 
circumstances could alienate away property which is before the court for 
determination is obvious. 
Tuft, 657 P.2d at 1302 (quoting Glynn v. Dubin, 369 P.2d 930, 931 (1962)). 
Far from acknowledging the importance and applicability of these policies, 
however, Plaintiffs literally argue in their Brief of Appellants that they were free to sell or 
encumber their houses, destroying Parkside's security interest, and that there was nothing 
any of the Defendants could do about it without subjecting themselves to a 
$5,000,000.00+ lawsuit. As Plaintiffs put it, "[i]t is possible that sureties may attempt to 
subject to the outcome of this case." 921 P.2d at 1393 (emphasis added). The fact that 
the borrowers intended to file an amended counterclaim raising issues directly involving 
title to the trust deed property simply was not part of the Court's analysis of this issue. 
Also, Winters v. Schulman, 977 P.2d 1218 (Utah App. 1999), upon which 
Plaintiffs rely heavily (Br. of Appellants at 19, 21), is readily distinguishable from this 
case. In Winters, the defendant had recorded a lis pendens referring to a divorce action 
that had been concluded by a final order seven years earlier. Id. at 1223. Moreover, the 
lis pendens was recorded on property that the ex-husband had not acquired until a year 
after the final divorce decree. Id. at 1220. In this case, by contrast, Defendants recorded 
the Lis Pendens with respect to a pending unlawful detainer action in which the property 
upon which the Lis Pendens were recorded had been expressly pledged as security. 
Furthermore, to the extent that the Court of Appeals in Winters employed dicta 
suggesting a stricter standard for assessing the propriety of lis pendens than the standard 
employed by this Court in Timm, this Court's approach obviously takes precedence. 
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alienate surety lands before landlords have an opportunity to file independent actions 
against the sureties to enforce their obligations on Renters Counter-Bonds." (Br. of 
Appellants at 25 n.6.) Yet Plaintiffs dismiss such appalling possibilities as unimportant, 
casually asserting that it should be "left . . . to the Utah Legislature to make other 
provisions." Id 
This argument, like this entire lawsuit, demonstrates an amazingly cavalier attitude 
by Plaintiffs toward the responsibilities they chose to assume as sureties in the Unlawful 
Detainer Action. This is not, as Plaintiffs contend (Br. of Appellants at 21), a case in 
which a party has improperly recorded a lis pendens merely because it ultimately intends 
to satisfy a money judgment by executing on the opposing party's real property. See, 
e.g., Busch v. Doyle, 141 B.R. 432, 436 (D. Utah 1992). Rather, it is case in which 
Kasteler and Daines chose to act as sureties and voluntarily elected to place title to their 
houses at issue by pledging them as security in the Unlawful Detainer Action. 
What did Kasteler and Daines think they were doing when they made these 
commitments to the court and Parkside in the Unlawful Detainer Action? How can they 
argue with a straight face that they were immediately free to go out and sell or encumber 
the very houses that they had just "posted with the Court" to satisfy a court order 
requiring security to protect Parkside in the Unlawful Detainer Action? (R. 99-100, 188-
94; Add. C, D.) If such actions were permitted, property bonds in unlawful detainer 
actions would be absolutely worthless. The allegedly tortious Lis Pendens that 
Defendants recorded in this case merely functioned to inform a universe of otherwise 
bona-fide purchasers that any interest they acquired in Kasteler's and Daines' houses 
would be subordinate to the property bond with which Kasteler and Daines had already 
chosen to burden themselves. The only thing the Lis Pendens prevented Kasteler and 
Daines from doing was selling or encumbering their houses out from under the property 
bond—the very thing they had essentially promised they would not do when they pledged 
the houses as security. Under these circumstances, the Defendant attorneys arguably 
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would have committed malpractice if they had not filed the Lis Pendens on behalf of their 
client. At very least, the Lis Pendens were proper under the Utah statute, and Plaintiffs' 
claims were properly dismissed by the district court. 
III. APART FROM THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S 
DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION WAS CORRECT BECAUSE THE LIS 
PENDENS AT ISSUE ARE ABSOLUTELY PRIVILEGED UNDER THE 
JUDICIAL PROCEEDING PRIVILEGE. 
Even if the Lis Pendens at issue in this case were technically improper under the 
lis pendens statute (which they were not), the dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint was still 
correct because this Court has expressly held that lis pendens filed in connection with 
pending actions are absolutely privileged and cannot give rise to liability. In Hansen v. 
Kohler, 550 P.2d 186 (Utah 1976), as part of a complicated dispute over a real estate 
transaction, one party brought a "slander of title" action against another party based on 
the latter's filing of lis pendens in an action that was pending between them. Id. at 189. 
In remanding the case, this Court directed the district court to dismiss the slander of title 
claim for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, id., reasoning as 
follows: 
The contention of Hansen is the recording of the lis pendens was privileged; 
and, therefore, Pierce had no claim for slander of title. This contention is 
well made. . . . The sole purpose of recording a notice of lis pendens is to 
give constructive notice of the pendency of the proceeding; its only 
foundation is the action filed—it has no existence independent of it. . . . 
[S]ince the effect of a lis pendens is to give constructive notice of all the 
facts apparent on the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a notice of lis 
pendens is, in effect, a republication of tne pleadings. Since the publication 
of the pleadings is absolutely privileged, the republication thereof by 
recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly privileged.... In the instant 
action, Hansen's recordation of a lis pendens was absolutely privileged and 
the action of Pierce for slander of title cannot be sustained. 
Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added; citations omitted). 
This Court's recognition in Hansen of an absolute privilege for lis pendens 
recorded in connection with pending actions22 was merely a speciafeed application of the 
The Hansen court distinguished an earlier Utah case—Birch v. Fuller, 337 P.2d 
964 (1959)—in which there was no legal action pending at the time the lis pendens was 
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"judicial proceeding privilege/' which creates an absolute privilege against liability for 
any statements made in connection with judicial proceedings. Indeed, the Hansen court 
cited to the very same provisions of the Restatement of Torts that establish the more 
general judicial proceeding privilege: 
The privilege stated in this section is based upon the public interest in 
according to all men the utmost freedom of access to the courts of justice 
lor the settlement of their private disputes. Like the privilege of an 
attorney, it is absolute. It protects a party to a private litigation or a private 
prosecutor m a criminal prosecution from liability for defamation 
irrespective of his purpose in publishing the defamatory matter, of his belief 
in its truth or even his knowledge of its falsity. 
Id. at 190 (emphasis added) (quoting Restatement of Torts § 587 cmt. a). 
This Court has long recognized that statements of attorneys, parties, judges, 
witnesses, and other participants in the judicial process enjoy an absolute privilege 
against defamation liability if made during a judicial proceeding. See, e.g., DeBry v. 
Godbe, 1999 UT 111, f 10, 992 P.2d 979. The Court candidly recognizes that this 
"privilege protects those who make otherwise defamatory statements from legal liability." 
Price v. Armour, 949 P.2d 1251, 1256 (Utah 1997). "The policy behind such privilege is 
to encourage full and candid participation in judicial proceedings by shielding the 
participant from potential liability for defamation." Id. at 1256. The judicial proceeding 
privilege "is premised on the assumption that the integrity of the judicial system requires 
that there be free and open expression by all participants and that this will only occur if 
they are not inhibited by the risk of subsequent defamation suits." Id. at 1256 (quoting 
Allen v. Ortez, 802 P.2d 1307 (Utah 1990)). 
In typical defamation cases, this Court has devised a three-part test to determine 
whether a particular type of statement is entitled to the protection of the judicial 
filed. 550 P.2d at 190. In such circumstances, lis pendens lose their absolute privilege. 
Id. In this case, however, the Complaint allegations themselves establish that the 
Unlawful Detainer Action was pending at the time Defendants filed the Lis Pendens at 
issue. The absolute privilege is therefore fully applicable. 
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proceeding privilege. DeBry, 1999 UT 111, ^ 11; Price, 949 P.2d at 1256.23 The Hansen 
case essentially represents the Court's conclusion that as a category of "statements," lis 
pendens recorded during pending actions satisfy any applicable tests, qualify for the 
absolute judicial proceeding privilege, and cannot give rise to liability. This conclusion is 
fatal to Plaintiffs' claims in this case. 
Moreover, although Hansen appears to have involved only a "slander of title" 
claim, the absolute privilege recognized by the Hansen court applies to all claims for 
relief arising out of the privileged statements—in this case the Lis Pendens. See DeBry, 
1999 UT 111 f 25 (concluding that "the judicial proceeding privilege extends not only to 
defamation claims but to "all claims arising from the same statements'") (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Price, 949 P.2d at 1258). For this reason, the absolute privilege bars all 
five of Plaintiffs' claims—each of which arises out of the Lis Pendens. This privilege 
provides an independent ground—wholly apart from the appropriateness of the Lis 
Pendens, discussed above—upon which this Court can affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs' 
Complaint. 
In an effort to avoid the clear applicability of the judicial proceeding privilege, 
Plaintiffs have proposed an erroneous interpretation of Utah's "absolute privilege" 
doctrine that renders the doctrine completely meaningless. (Br. of Appellants at 27-30.) 
First, Plaintiffs assert that the absolute privilege accorded to lis pendens has been 
"supplanted" to the extent it is inconsistent with the wrongful lien statute. Id. at 27-28. 
In other words Plaintiffs appear to argue that a lis pendens is not entitled to the protection 
of the privilege unless it complies with the law in all respects anyway. 
23
 "To establish the judicial proceeding privilege, the statements must be (1) cmade 
during or in the course of a judicial proceeding'; (2) 'have some reference to the subject 
matter of the proceeding'; and (3) be 'made by someone acting in the capacity of judge, 
juror, witness, litigant, or counsel.'" DeBry, 1999 UT 111, ^ 11 (quoting Price, 949 P.2d 
at 1256). 
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Of course, it makes no sense for the law to afford a "privilege" to statements that 
would not be actionable even in the absence of the privilege, and courts from other 
jurisdictions have considered and expressly rejected Plaintiffs' argument. In Prappas v. 
Meyerland Cmty. Improvement Ass'n, 795 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct App. 1990), the plaintiff 
made the very same argument that Plaintiffs make here: that the judicial proceeding 
privilege does not apply to lis pendens that are filed in contravention of the applicable lis 
pendens statute. The appellate court squarely rejected this contention, holding that the 
existence of the privilege was not dependent upon whether or not the conduct was 
"authorized" or "unauthorized" by the relevant statutory requirements. Id. at 798 (stating 
that "[w]e cannot accept [plaintiffs5] distinction between 'authorized' and 'unauthorized' 
[lis pendens] notices, turning as it does on technical compliance with the statute"). The 
court stated that the proper remedy for a plaintiff harmed by an improperly filed lis 
pendens is not a tort suit against the filer, but, rather, a request for a judicial order 
removing the lis pendens. IcL at 797.24 The court used examples from other judicial 
contexts to explain its holding: 
For example, irrelevant evidence is inadmissible in a trial. [Rule 402]. 
Such evidence, when offered, is therefore subject to an order to strike it 
from the record. Thus if a witness testifies, "Yes, the defendant is the man 
who shot me, and by the way, he has a loathsome disease," the court should 
sustain a timely objection, strike the slanderous remark, and instruct the 
jury to disregard it. Yet no one would suppose for a moment that the 
privilege evaporated simply because the comment was unauthorized. The 
same result would occur it an impropriety surfaced in another part of civil 
proceedings . . . , namely pleadings. For example, an amended pleading 
would be "unauthorized" if it were filed late and without leave of court, see 
Tex. R. Civ. P. 63, but one cannot conceive of such a defect making the 
slightest difference as far as absolute privilege is concerned. Rather, the 
remedy would be for the aggrieved party to ask the court to strike the 
24
 As noted above, in Defendant Savage's August 20 letter to Plaintiffs' counsel, 
he invited Plaintiffs to address the propriety of the Lis Pendens with the court in the 
Unlawful Detainer Action, stating, "If you disagree with this position, please let me know 
and we will address this matter to the Court." (R. 221; Br. of Appellants at 5-6 and Ex. 
4.) Plaintiffs never accepted this common-sense invitation to test the validity of the Lis 
Pendens in the Unlawful Detainer Action, preferring instead to file a separate multi-
million-dollar tort action against Defendants. 
366159.1 29 
offending papers. Although such a pleading, like irrelevant evidence, is not 
authorized in the sense in which appellants employ that term, no loss of 
privilege ensues. 
Id. (emphasis added); see also Manders v. Manders, 897 F. Supp. 972, 976-78 (S.D. 
Tex. 1995) (citing Prappas and granting summary judgment to a defendant where the 
plaintiff alleged that the defendant had intentionally interfered with plaintiffs business 
relations by allegedly maliciously and unlawfully filing a lis pendens). 
Under this authority, the Lis Pendens at issue in this case enjoy the protection of 
the absolute judicial proceeding privilege even if they were recorded in direct 
contravention of the lis pendens statute (which they were not). Indeed, when this Court 
extended the privilege to lis pendens in Hansen, it expressly acknowledged that the 
privilege would protect lis pendens that were otherwise improper, shielding those who 
record them from liability "irrespective of [their] purpose in publishing the defamatory 
matter, of [their] belief in its truth or even [their] knowledge of its falsity." 550 P.2d at 
190. If deliberate falsity does not strip lis pendens of the protection of the absolute 
privilege, the privilege must certainly remain intact in the face of alleged technical 
noncompliance with the lis pendens statute. 
The only factor identified in the Hansen opinion that can operate to deprive a lis 
pendens of the protection of the absolute privilege is if it is recorded when no lawsuit is 
pending. 550 P.2d at 190. This exception is inapplicable in this case because the 
Unlawful Detainer Action was pending at the time the Lis Pendens were recorded. 
Plaintiffs nevertheless seek to take advantage of this exception by repeating their 
erroneous argument that an "independent action" was allegedly necessary to enforce 
Plaintiffs' bond. As a result, Plaintiffs again argue, the Unlawful Detainer Action did not 
"affect title" to Plaintiffs' houses and the Lis Pendens were therefore "unsupported" by a 
pending action. (Br. of Appellants at 23-30.) 
This argument remains incorrect for all of the reasons discussed above in section II 
of this brief. Even more importantly in the present context, this argument simply misses 
366159 1 30 
the point of the judicial proceeding privilege. In an unpublished 1991 decision involving 
Utah law, the Tenth Circuit applied the absolute privilege doctrine to affirm the dismissal 
of a slander of title claim based on the filing of a lis pendens by Utah County. Fitzgerald 
v. Utah County, 931 F.2d 900, 1991 WL 70672 (10 th Cir. April 29, 1991) (attached 
hereto as Addendum L.25 Utah County had recorded a lis pendens on land owned by the 
Fitzgeralds that had been the subject of an unrecorded sale. IdL at **3. The lis pendens 
referred to a lawsuit that Utah County had filed challenging similar unrecorded land sales, 
but not the Fitzgeralds'. Despite the fact that the Fitzgeralds were not parties to the 
lawsuit referenced in the lis pendens (and were in fact much further removed from that 
lawsuit than Plaintiffs in this case were from the Unlawful Detainer Action), the Tenth 
Circuit held that the absolute privilege doctrine set forth in Hansen v. Kohler barred their 
slander of title claim: 
Utah holds that the recording of a lis pendens is privileged and therefore 
cannot support a claim for slander of title. See Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 
186, 189-90 (Utah 1976). . . . The instant case is distinguishable from Birch 
v Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 964 (1959), upon which the Fitzgeralds 
rely, because in Birch no underlying action was filed. Here, as in Hansen, 
an underlying lawsuit was filed. Although plaintiffs argue that Ftansen is 
not controlling because they were not named in the suitf we conclude that 
this fact is not significant. The decision in Hansen was based on the 
Court's holding that a lis pendens is privileged because it merely 
here thus derives its privilege from the action it republishes. In Birch, to the 
republishes the pleadings, whicn are themselves privileged. The lis pendens 
contrary, the lis pendens did not republish an underlying privileged 
pleading. 
Id. (emphasis added). This analysis applies just as strongly, if not more strongly, to the 
Lis Pendens at issue in this case, which simply consisted of a fair republication of 
absolutely privileged filings in the Unlawful Detainer Action. For this reason, the judicial 
25
 Defendants also presented a copy of the Fitzgerald case to the district court. (R. 
264-67.) Although Fitzgerald is not binding precedent in this Court, both because it is a 
federal court opinion and because it is unpublished, Defendants nevertheless offer the 
case as a well-reasoned articulation of the legal principles they urge this Court to employ 
in addressing virtually identical privilege issues. 
366159.1 31 
proceeding privilege shields the Lis Pendens from liability and provides an alternative 
basis for affirming the district court's dismissal order. 
IV. APART FROM THE LIS PENDENS STATUTE AND THE ABSOLUTE 
PRIVILEGE, THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL OF THIS ACTION 
WAS CORRECT BECAUSE EACH CLAIM IN THE COMPLAINT 
INDEPENDENTLY FAILS TO STATE A VALID CLAIM FOR RELIEF. 
Plaintiffs' arguments before both the district court and this Court have focused 
almost exclusively on whether the Lis Pendens were statutorily permissible under the 
terms of the lis pendens statute, Utah Code Ann. section 78-40-2. By focusing so 
prominently on this issue rather than the actual elements of their claims for relief, 
Plaintiffs appear to assume that if the Lis Pendens were improper under the statute, it 
necessarily follows that they support Plaintiffs' tort claims against Defendants. 
That assumption is unwarranted. Although the Lis Pendens certainly cannot be 
actionable if they satisfied the terms of the lis pendens statute, the opposite is not 
necessarily true. Even if the Lis Pendens were technically improper under the statute 
(which they were not), and even if they were not absolutely privileged (which they were), 
the Lis Pendens still do not, as matter of law, satisfy the essential elements of any of 
Plaintiffs' individual claims for relief. Plaintiffs could and should have addressed any 
alleged concerns they had regarding Defendants' compliance with the lis pendens statute 
simply by asking the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action to release the Lis Pendens, as 
Defendant Savage invited them to do. (R. 221; Br. of Appellants at 5-6 and Ex. 4.) 
Indeed, almost all of the cases cited by Plaintiffs concerning the propriety of lis pendens 
merely address the question of whether the court should release or remove the lis pendens 
at issue. They do not involve tort claims based on the filing of lis pendens.26 A careful 
26
 See, e.g., Timm v. Dewsnup, 921 P.2d 1381, 1392-93 (Utah 1996) (holding that 
trial court had erred in "releasing" lis pendens); Boyce v. Boyce, 609 P.2d 928, 932 (Utah 
1980) (reviewing trial court's order to remove notice of lis pendens); Hamilton v. Smith, 
808 F.2d 36, 37 (10 th Cir. 1986) (affirming trial court's injunction against filing notice of 
lis pendens in action that did not affect the title to real property); Busch v. Doyle, 141 
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analysis of the individual claims set forth in Plaintiffs' Complaint shows that none of 
them states a valid claim 1 ipoi i w 1 licl 11 elief i na> be granted. 
A. Plaintiffs' "Wrongful Lien" Claim Fails Because Lis Pendens Are Not 
Liens and Are Expressly Excluded From the Coverage of the Wrongful 
Lien Statute. 
Plaintiffs' "wrongful lien" claim, Complaint at 4-7, is based on Utah Code Ann. §§ 
38-9 1 t :> • 5 (199 7) and is fi n idai t lei itall> flaw ed foi a i i/i n :t lbei :>f i easons I\ 
importantly, the wrongful lien claim fails for the simple reason that lis pendens are not 
liens, under either statutory definitions or common law. Under the statutory definition, to 
constitute a "wrongful lien," a document must . jate a lien or encui i i 
on an owner's interest in certain real property ? Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1 (19971 \ 
lis pendens simplv docs not imvt this statutory definition because it does not "encumber" 
the property on which it is recorded. Ji merely provides record notice that pending 
proceedings might affect title to the property. As this Court has observed, "[t]he sole 
purpose of recordiiig a lis pei idei is is to give consti i icti \ e i lotice of the pendency of 
proceedings which may be derogatory to an owner's title or right to possession." Hidden 
Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 590 P.2d 1244, 1248 (Utah 1979). Courts from other 
jurisdictions have expressly interpreted this distinction to mean tl ia.1: a lis pendens is not a. 
lien. See, e.g., Dime Sav. Bank of New York v. Sandy Springs Assocs., Inc., 261 Ga. 
485, 486, 405 S.E.2d 491, 493 (1991) ("A lis pendens is not a lien on the property It 
merely not ??-.-s prospecti v e pi n chasers that the property is involved in a lawsuit ") 
(emphasis added; citations omitted); Chenich v. Chenich, 87 B.R. 101, 106 ( 9 t h Cir. 
1988) ("[A] lis pendens is not a lien in the property or a vested right. It is merely a notice 
of litigation which is dependent upon the outcome oftli.it dilution " (emphasis added)). 
B.R. 432, 436 (D. Utah 1992) (granting motion for oi < ic :i: to i c lease lis pendei i 5 in ; i< ;ti< >n 
that did not affect the title to real property). 
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This case dramatically illustrates the difference between a lis pendens and a "lien 
or encumbrance." The Lis Pendens at issue in this case did not "create" any encumbrance 
of any kind on Plaintiffs' houses. They merely described, truthfully, a pending legal 
proceeding that had the potential to result in the sale of Plaintiffs' houses to satisfy a 
judgment. The "encumbrance" on Plaintiffs' houses was created by the property bond 
that they themselves posted in the Unlawful Detainer Action pledging their houses as 
security. The Lis Pendens simply identified that encumbrance; it did not create it.27 
Thus, the Court should not be moved by Plaintiffs' cry that the Lis Pendens had the effect 
of rendering their houses "unmarketable and unsuitable as security for a loan." (Br. of 
Appellants at 16.) They should have expected as much when they pledged their houses as 
security. And if they were attempting to sell the houses out from under the property 
bond, then they are the ones who should be called upon to explain themselves in this 
matter—not Defendants. 
Moreover, lest there were any doubt that lis pendens do not create "liens or 
encumbrances" within the meaning of the wrongful lien statute, Ihe statute contains a 
"scope" section that expressly excludes lis pendens from the statute's coverage. "The 
provisions of this [wrongful lien] chapter shall not prevent a person from filing a lis 
pendens in accordance with Section 78-40-2 " Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-2(2) (1997) 
(emphasis added). It is difficult to imagine how the wrongful lien statute could be more 
clear in excluding lis pendens from its coverage.28 
Another way to illustrate this distinction is to imagine that Savage and Evans 
had simply recorded the property bond itself, rather than recording lis pendens describing 
the bond. The effect on the marketability of Plaintiffs houses would have been exactly 
the same because it was the bond that encumbered title to Plaintiffs' houses. The Lis 
Pendens did not become "liens" merely because they were the means Defendants 
employed to tell the world that Plaintiffs had encumbered their houses. 
28
 This statutory exclusion also underscores the basic proposition that lis pendens 
are not liens. 
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Plaintiffs respond to this argument by asserting that because this statutory 
exclusion refers to lis pendens filed "in accordance v ith Section 78 40-2" c A tl le I II ai i 
Code, it should only apply to lis pendens that strictly satisfy the requirements of the lis 
peiK lens stat ut< ( B i < >f \ ppellants at 18.) Plaintiffs' argument fails because it would 
render the statutory exclusion in section 38-9-2(2) mere surplusage. The basic statuiti >r> 
definition of "wrongful lien" already provides that the filing or recording of a document is 
not "wrongful" if it is "expressly ai ithoi ized"b) an.) "state or federal statute." Utah Code 
Ann. § 38-9-l(6)(a) (1997). Thus, lis pendens that comply perfectly with the lis pendens 
statute are excluded from the definition of "wrongful lien" at the outset. For the express 
statutory exclusion in section IX {)-2(?) lo luivi1 ,inv n liqxTiilnil signiikanu1 ml iiiiisl be 
interpreted to exclude all lis pendens that persons purport to file in accordance with the lis 
pendens statute, even if they run afoul of the terms of that statute in some respect (which 
the Lis Pendens in this case do not). 
This is the appropriate interpretation under pertinent canons of statutory 
consl ruction, "\ v hich provide tl lat com ts "are compelled to give the statutory language 
meaning," should "assume that each term in the statute was used advisedly," and should 
"avoid an interpretation which renders portions of, or words in, a statute superfluous or 
in< >i >erati « < ; " Platts v. Parents Helping Parents, 94 7 P 2< I 658, 662 (Utah 1997) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). A statutory interpretation that "fails to give effect 
to all parts of the statute is contrary to [the Utah Supreme Court ' s ] general rules of 
statutoi > consti \ K tioi i " Bd. of Equalization v. State I a x C o m m n , - l o, i79 
(Utah 1996) (holding that statutory "exemptions" must be construed so that each has 
independent significance). Thus, to give effect to all statutory terms, this Court should 
regardless of whether the lis pendens comply perfectly with the lis pendens statute. 
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B. Plaintiffs' "Slander of Title" Claim Fails Because the Lis Pendens Were 
Truthful as a Matter of Law and Because Plaintiffs Failed To Allege Special 
Damages. 
Plaintiffs' "slander of title" claim is fatally defective for at least two critical 
reasons. First, the claim fails because the Lis Pendens were not "false" as a matter of law. 
The existence of a false statement is an essential element of a slander of title claim under 
Utah law. Bass v. Planned Mgmt. Servs., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1988). Courts from 
various jurisdictions have affirmed the dismissal of slander of title complaints based on 
lis pendens that accurately describe the proceedings to which they refer. See, e.g., 
Ringier Am., Inc. v. Enviro-Technics, Ltd., 284 111. App. 3d 1102, 1106, 673 N.E.2d 444, 
447 (1996) (1996) ("Because the lis pendens notice does no more than accurately inform 
its reader of the existence of the counterclaim, it was in no sense 'false' and cannot form 
the basis of liability."); Scott-Kinnear, Inc. v. Eberly & Meade, Inc., 879 P.2d 838, 840 
(Okla. 1994) (affirming dismissal of slander of title claim based on lis pendens that 
"fairly stated the issues of the lawsuit to which it related").29 In this case, a simply review 
of the Lis Pendens shows that they fairly described the circumstances of the Unlawful 
Detainer Action and were not "false." (R. 14-17,20-23; Add. E and F.) 
Throughout this case, Plaintiffs have never even attempted to rebut this argument. 
They completely ignored the argument at the district court level, and there is absolutely 
no contention that the Lis Pendens were "false" anywhere in the Brief of Appellants. 
Regardless of anything else, the absence of "falsity" in the Lis Pendens is fatal to 
Plaintiffs' slander of title claim. 
Moreover, the slander of title claim fails for the separate reason that Plaintiffs have 
not adequately alleged special damages as required under Utah law. To recover for 
29
 Significantly, both of these courts also held that the respective slander of title 
claims were properly dismissed because the lis pendens in question were absolutely 
privileged, following the same line of reasoning employed by this Court in Hansen. 
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slander of title, a plaintiff must, among other things, prove that he or she has suffered 
"special damages": 
There are no general or presumed damages in slander of title actions. 
Special damages are ordinarily proved in a slander of title action by 
evidence of a lost sale or the loss of some other pecuniary advantage. 
Absent a specific monetary loss flowing from a slander affecting the 
saleability or use of the property, there is no damaged 
Bass, 761 P,2d at 568 (emphasis added). When special damages an; dawned, .ILN ivqwwvd 
to state a claim for slander of title, they must be specifically stated in the complaint. Utah 
R. Civ. r . y^g). A complaint that fails to allege special damages in connection with a 
claim that requires a showing of special damages is subject to dismissal under I Jtali R 
Civ. I\ 12(b)(6). See Allred v. Cook, 590 P.2d 318, 322 (Utah 1979) (affirming dismissal 
of slander complaint that clain led no special damage). In this case, to satisfy the pleading 
rules, Plaintiffs would have had to allege specifically in their Complaint that they tried to 
sell their houses and failed because the Lis Pendens were on record. Plaintiffs, of course, 
houses would be tantamount to admitting that were deliberately attempting to impair the 
security that they had posted with the court in the Unlawful Detainer Action. 
erroneous interpretation of the case law discussed above. (Br. of Appellants at 32-33.) 
First, notwithstanding Defendants' assertion to the contrary, the Bass case does in fact 
provide I hat " "special damages" ii i tl ic foi i n of a specific lost sale attribi itable to tl le 
alleged slander must be proven to sustain a slander of title claim. 761 P.2d at 568. 
Second, mere "notice pleading" is insufficient with respect to special damages. The Utah 
Rules of Civil hoeetitue require special damages to be alleged specifically , arid slander 
of title claims are subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) if that requirement is not met. 
Finally, and directly contrary to Plaintiffs' assertion, the Bass case expressly states that a 
claim for attorney's fees incurred to remove a cloud from a plaintiffs title is insufficient 
to supply the required element of "special damages" if the plaintiff fails to allege and 
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prove the loss of a specific sales opportunity. 761 P.2d at 569. Plaintiffs' slander of title 
claim lacks the necessary element of special damages and fails as a matter of law. 
C. Plaintiffs' "Quiet Title" Claim Is Moot Because Defendants Have Released 
the Lis Pendens. 
The Lis Pendens were released on September 1, 1999 (R. 136-39, 141-44; Add. J, 
K), and Plaintiffs' quiet title claim is therefore moot. Plaintiffs' groundless and 
speculative fear that "there is nothing to prevent Appellees from improperly re-filing" the 
Lis Pendens in the future (Br. of Appellants at 33-34), is an insufficient reason to keep 
this claim alive under the "capable of repetition yet evading judicial review" exception to 
the mootness doctrine.30 
D. Plaintiffs' "Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress" Claim Fails 
Because Defendants' Alleged Conduct Was Not "Outrageous" as a Matter 
of Law. 
Plaintiffs' "intentional infliction of emotional distress" ("IIED") claim fails as a 
matter of law because the conduct alleged in the Complaint is insufficiently "outrageous" 
to state a valid IIED claim. Among other things, a plaintiff asserting an IIED claim must 
prove that the defendant engaged in conduct considered "outrageous and intolerable in 
that it offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality." Russell v. 
Thomson Newspapers, Inc., 842 P.2d 896, 905 (Utah 1992) (citing Samms v. Eccles, 358 
P.2d 344, 346-47 (Utah 1962)). Whether conduct is sufficiently outrageous to support 
such a claim is a threshold question for the court to resolve as a matter of law. Keller v. 
Ray, Quinney & Nebeker, 896 F. Supp. 1563, 1573 (D. Utah 1995) (granting summary 
judgment where conduct alleged was not "outrageous and intolerable"), affd, 78 F.3d 
597 (10 th Cir. 1996); Sperber v. Galigher Ash Co., 747 P.2d 1025,1028 (Utah 1987). 
30
 Moreover, the Unlawful Detainer Action is over and on appeal, so there would 
be no reason to re-file the Lis Pendens in any event. 
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Under Utah law, courts have routinely held conduct far more extreme than 
Defendants' filing ol llu: I is h ndi-ir In IN; msuffinentl \ uulra^eous to sustain i claim for 
IIED. For example, in Keller, the court ruled that statements by the defendant threatening 
to crush the plaintiff "like a peanut," "put him out of business," "take everything he 
owned," and "follow Plaintiff'" his grave ' war insufficient!', otifiap^ir^ <o .upptji ,in 
IIED claim as a matter of law. 896 F. Supp, at 1573 In another case, threatening an 
emplt v*^
 t ^crediting his reputation, and wrongfully removing him from an 
important position ii i \ 'iolation of public policy were held, to be insufficiently outi •. s 
to satisfy the standards of Utah law. Boisjoly v. Morton Thiokol, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 795, 
802 (D I Jt< ill 1988) Defendants ' filing of the I is Pendens at issue in this case pales in 
compar ison to such conduct , and Plaintiffs ' I IED claim accordingly fails as a mat te r of 
law. 
E . Plaintiffs ' "Negl igent Infliction of Emotional Dis t ress" Cla im Fails Because 
It Omits Essential Elements of That Cause of Act ion. 
Finally, Plaintiffs ' "negligent infliction of emotional d is t ress" ( "NIED") c la im fails 
as a mat ter of law because the Complaint allegations do not remotely satisfy the e lements 
of N I E D as recognized by tl lis Court. Reco\ ei ) foi 1 flED is permit ted oi lb in iiai i c:n v 
ci rcumstances in which a plaintiff "was personally within the zone of danger" created by 
tht" defendant ' s negligence "and feared physical impact or peril due to the negl igent acts 
of the defendant. . . ." Hansen v. Sea Ray Boats , Inc., 830 P.2d 2MK 240 (I Hah \W) 
(emphasis added) . See also Straub v. Fisher and Paykel Heal th Care , 1999 U T 102, f 8, 
990 P.2d 384 (no recovery lor NIED "unless the plaintiff herself has been placed in actual 
physical per i l") ; Lawson v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc. , 901 P 2d 1013. 1016 (I Itah 1995) 
(holding that N I E D action "requires that the plaintiff feared physical injury or per i l") . 
I'htititiffV Compliiml atlct?a(tiHis h i l to satisfy thestMfclrm<»n|s nf an NIED claim, and their 
c laim should accordingly be dismissed. 
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In attempting to defend their NIED claim (Br. of Appellants at 34-35), Plaintiffs 
cite exclusively to Handy v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 841 P.2d 1210, 1217-18 (Utah App. 
1992). The Handy case, however, does not even involve Utah law. It is a Federal 
Employer Liability Act ("FELA") case that happened to be tried in Utah state court, and 
the formulation of NIED set forth in that case is taken from an opinion of a federal district 
court in Massachusetts dealing with negligence in the FELA context. Moreover, even if 
the NIED standard set forth in Handy were the correct legal standard, it would still 
require an allegation that Plaintiffs suffered "physical harm manifested by objective 
symptomatology." Id. at 1217. Plaintiffs state in their Brief of Appellant that the 
Complaint contains such an allegation (Br. of Appellants at 35), but that is simply not 
true. The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs suffered "physical harm" as a result of 
the Lis Pendens. (R. 10-11.) The NIED claim fails as a matter of law and was properly 
dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court properly dismissed Plaintiffs' Complaint in its entirety because 
the Lis Pendens at issue in this case complied in all respects with the lis pendens statute. 
The district court's dismissal order was also correct because the Lis Pendens are 
absolutely privileged and because each separate claim in Plaintiffs' Complaint 
independently fails as a matter of law. This Court should affirm the judgment below in 
all respects. 
DATED this 16 fay of November, 2000. 
FRDO^WpltOBERTS 
JAMES T. BLANCH 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this^— day of November, 2000,1 caused to be mailed by 
first-class mail, postage prepaid, two true and correct copies ut Ihe fuuuoini, IWUV I 111' 
APPELLEES to each of the following: 
John Martinez 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
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Deputy Clerk 
GREGGORY J. SAVAGE, MATTHEW N. 
EVANS, HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, a 
Utah Limited Partnership, 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 990908395 
Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI 
Court Clerk: Janet Banks 
January 19, 2000 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument with 
respect to this motion on November 29, 1999. Following the 
hearing, the matter was taken under advisement. 
The Court having now considered the motions, memoranda, 
exhibits attached thereto and for the good cause that has been 
shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
BACKGROUND 
This case centers around the procedures a landlord must use to 
enforce a tenant's property counter-bond against the tenant's 
surety. Specifically, on July 17, 1998, defendant Parkside Salt 
Lake Corporation ("Parkside"), filed an unlawful detainer action 
against Insure-Rite, Inc. ("Insure-Rite") , alleging that Insure-
Rite had unlawfully failed to vacate certain business premises 
P O O \ 
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owned by Parkside, which are located at 215 South State Street. On 
August 13, 1998, the court in the unlawful detainer action entered 
an order requiring Insure-Rite to post a counter-possession bond in 
the form of a property bond, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-36-
8.5(2) (b), as security for the costs and actual damages that 
Parkside would be entitled to recover if it prevailed in the 
unlawful detainer action. On that same day, G. Richard Kasteler 
("Kasteler") and Mary L. Daines ("Daines")-the plaintiffs in the 
present action-complied with the court's order in the unlawful 
detainer action by posting a Renter's Counter-Bond on behalf of 
Insure-Rite with the court in the unlawful detainer action. This 
bond pledged Kasteler's and Daines' homes as security. 
On November 30, 1998, the court in the unlawful detainer 
action granted partial summary judgment in favor of Parkside on its 
principal claim and entered an Order of Restitution directing 
Insure-Rite to promptly vacate the premises it had leased from 
Parkside. On March 15, 1999, the court in the unlawful detainer 
action entered an order granting summary judgment in favor of 
Parkside on the issue of damages and ordering Insure-Rite to pay 
Parkside a damage award of $108,417.24 plus interest, attorney's 
fees, and costs. 
On March 30, 1999, Greggory J. Savage ("Savage") and Matthew 
N. Evans ("Evans"), of Holme Roberts & Owen, in their capacity as 
002 
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counsel for Parkside, filed for recordation in the Salt Lake County 
Recorder's Office two lis pendens bearing the caption of the 
unlawful detainer action. 
Ultimately, the judgment was satisfied by other means. On 
September 1, 1999, Savage and Evans, on behalf of Parkside, filed 
documents with the Salt Lake County Recorder releasing the Lis 
Pendens on Kasteler's and Daines' houses. 
On August 18, 1999, Kasteler and Daines filed this action 
asserting claims for relief against al 1 defendants for wrongful 
lien, slander of title, quiet title, intentional infliction of 
emotional distress and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
ANALYSIS 
In support of their motion, defendants argue plaintiffs' 
complaint should be dismissed in its entirety because the lis 
pendens out of which all of plaintiffs' claims arise are both 
permitted by Utah's lis pendens statute and are absolutely 
privileged. Additionally, it is defendant's position each 
individual claim in plaintiffs' complaint suffers from specific 
defects that cause it to fail as a matter of law. 
Plaintiffs oppose the motion arguing Utah law expressly 
provides that the landlord must bring an independent action on the 
renter's counter-bond. Furthermore, assert plaintiffs, since 
defendants did not properly file the lis pendens, such filings are 
mr' '7i; 
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not protected by the judicial proceedings privilege. With respect 
to the claims individually, plaintiffs contend they have 
sufficiently pled all of the necessary elements to support their 
causes of action. 
AAA rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss admits the facts alleged in 
the complaint but challenges the plaintiff's right to relief based 
on those facts." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 
811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991) quoting 61A Am. Jur. 2d Pleading § 
227 (1981). When ruling on a rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss the 
factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn from them are considered in a 
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Xd. quoting Colman v. Utah 
State Land Board, 795 P.2d 622, 624 (Utah 1990); Lowe v. Sorenson 
Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann § 78-40-2: 
In any action affecting the title to, or the 
right of possession of, real property the 
plaintiff at the time of filing the complaint 
or thereafter, and the defendant at the time 
of filing his answer when affirmative relief 
is claimed in such answer, or at any time 
afterward, may file for record with the 
recorder of the county in which the property 
or some part thereof is situated a notice of 
the pendency of the action, containing the 
names of the parties, the object of the action 
or defense, and a description of the property 
in that county affected thereby. From the time 
of filing such notice for record only shall a 
purchaser or encumbrancer of the property 
affected thereby be deemed to have 
00277 
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constructive notice of the pendency of the 
action, and only of its pendency against 
parties designated by their real names. 
Plaintiff contends that since the prior action did not affect title 
to the houses posted as bond, the aforementioned required an 
independent action be filed. However, after reviewing the 
applicable statutory and case law, such does not appear to be the 
case. 
As an initial matter, the possession-bond statute provides the 
court in an unlawful detainer action jurisdiction by requiring that 
"[t]he bond shall be payable to the clerk of the court." Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-36-8.5(2)(b) (1996). Accordingly, rather than merely 
requiring sureties to submit personally to the jurisdiction of the 
court for enforcement purposes, the possession-bond statute ensures 
that the court will have jurisdiction to enforce a bond by 
essentially requiring the sureties to surrender to the court any 
money or property pledged as security. Indeed, if this were not 
the case, it would be impossible for the court to order "immediate" 
execution oh an unlawful detainer judgment-a procedure that the 
unlawful detainer statutes expressly require. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-36-10(4) (1996)-1 
1
 Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10(4) provides: 
If the proceeding is for unlawful detainer 
after default in the payment of the rent, 
execution upon the judgment shall be issued 
fl(V>7 
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Furthermore, the property bond that Kasteler and Daines posted 
in the unlawful detainer action satisfied the requirements of the 
possession-bond statute and the bond could have been enforced 
against them in that very action. Indeed, the bond which Kasteler 
and Daines signed designated their houses as "security posted with 
the Court" in the unlawful detainer action. It also contained the 
caption of the unlawful detainer action and was filed in the 
unlawful detainer action. Essentially, Kasteler and Daines 
surrendered their houses to the court in the unlawful detainer 
action as security for their undertaking to "pay all costs and 
damages which may be awarded to the Owner" in the unlawful detainer 
action up to the amount of $25,000. By this voluntary appearance 
and the pledging of their houses as security in the unlawful 
detainer action, Kasteler and Daines submitted themselves and their 
houses to the jurisdiction of the court, which could enforce the 
bond. Accordingly, no independent enforcement action was 
necessary. 
This position is further supported by the case of Fitzgerald 
v. Critchfield, 744 P.2d 301 (Utah App. Ct. 1987), where it was 
questioned whether the surety had submitted itself to the 
immediately after the entry of the judgment. 
In all cases, the judgment may be issued and 
enforced immediately. 
nn?79 
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jurisdiction of the court for purposes of enforcing the bond. In 
Fitzgerald, the Court of Appeals concluded that although the bond 
did not contain the precise language submitting the surety to the 
jurisdiction of the court, the bond would nevertheless "be enforced 
according to the terms of the authorizing rule." I_d. at 305. 
Furthermore, the court stated that as an alternative basis, the 
surety had made a general appearance at the show cause hearing, 
thereby submitting itself to the court's jurisdiction to enforce 
payment on its undertaking. Id. 
Based upon the forgoing, the Court concludes defendants were 
not required to bring an independent action on the renter's 
counter-bond. Further, since all parties agreed a finding by this 
Court that the lis pendens was proper under Utah's lis pendens 
results in the failure of plaintiffs' claims against defendants, 
the Court does not reach the merits of the plaintiffs' claims 
individually. Defendants' Motion to dismiss is well taken and 
accordingly, granted. 
DATED this / f day of January, 2000 
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C e r t i f i c a t e of Mailing 
I c e r t i f y tha t on the 20th day of January, 2 000, 1 sent by 
f i r s t c lass mail a t rue and correct copy of the a t tached document 
to the following:' 
GORDON L. ROBERTS 
JAMES T. BLANCH 
201 SOUTH MAIN STREET, SUITE 1800 
P.O. BOX 45898 
SLC, UTAH 84145-0898 
NICK J. COLESSIDES 
466 SOUTH 400 EAST, SUITE 100 
SLC, UTAH 84111-3325 
JOHN MARTINEZ 
2974 EAST ST MARY'S CIRCLE 
SLC, UTAH 84108 
D i s t r i c t Court Clerk 
By: ^ ^ Q W \ V ^ ^ 
^"^Teputy Clerk 
••Individuals with disabilities needing special accommodations during this 
proceeding should call 238-7300, at least three working days prior to 
the proceeding. 
TDD phone for hearing impaired, 238-7391. 
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JAMES T. BLANCH (6494) 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Post Office Box 45898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
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GREGGORY J. SAVAGE, MATTHEW N. 
EVANS, HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN, a 
Utah Limited Liability Partnership, 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORPORATION, 
a Delaware corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT 
Case No. 99 09 08395 
Judge Glenn Iwasaki 
* * * * * * * 
316376 I 00282 
On November 29, 1999, the Court heard oral argument on Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss Complaint in the above-captioned action. Defendants Greggory J. Savage, Matthew N. 
Evans, Holme Roberts & Owen, and Parkside Salt Lake Corporation were represented by their 
counsel, Gordon Roberts and James Blanch. Plaintiffs G. Richard Kasteler and Mary L. Daines 
were represented by their counsel, Nick Colessides. On January 19, 2000, the Court, having 
considered the written memoranda submitted by the parties, having reviewed the applicable legal 
authorities, having heard the oral arguments of counsel, and being fully advised in the premises, 
entered a Memorandum Decision ("Memorandum Decision") granting Defendants' Motion To 
Dismiss Complaint in its entirety. Now, for the reasons set forth in said Memorandum Decision, 
the Court hereby ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES as follows: 
1. For the reasons set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision, which is 
incorporated herein by reference, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a 
claim against Defendants upon which relief can be granted for any of the claims asserted therein. 
2. Pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court hereby 
dismisses all claims asserted in Plaintiffs' Complaint with prejudice, with Plaintiffs to bear 
Defendants' costs as provided in Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). 
3. This Order constitutes the Final Judgment of this Court on all claims asserted by 
any party in this action. Therefore, the Court hereby dismisses this action in its entirety, with 
prejudice. 
316376.1 00283 
IT IS SO ORDERED this / day oT January; 2000. 
BYTH 
Honorable Glenn Iwasaki 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to form and substance: 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this i f "day of January, 2000,1 caused to be hand-delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND FINAL JUDGMENT to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3325 
John Martinez 
Attorney at Law 
2974 East St. Mary's Circle 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84108 
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (/ 696) 
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 7209) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
\ ORDER 
• SETTING AMOUNT 
) FOR COUNTER POSSESSION BOND 
\ Case No. 98 090 6982 
{ Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
Based upon Defendants Motion Setting Amount for Counter 
Possession Bond, pursuant to § 78-36-8.5 (2) (b) UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
1953 as amended, 1996 Replacement, and good cause otherwise 
appearing therefor 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, DECREED, AND ADJUDGED 
that the amount of the Counter Possession Bond is hereby set at 
\s •> -
District Court Judge 
C:\WPDOCS\I\in3urite v parkside.9.wpd —.> - ..• 
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MAI-LING CEKTI-FICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Order Setting Amount of 
Counter Possession Bond to: 
MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ 
MR GREGORY J SAVAGE ESQ 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, first 
class mail, this /y*day of August, 1998. 
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NICK J. COLESSIDES (# 696) 
JOHN T. GIANNOPOULOS (# 7209) 
Attorney at Law 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
Tele: (801) 521-4441 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. 
• RENTERS COUNTER BOND 
| Case No. 98 090 6982 
Judge: Stephen L. Henriod 
This property bond represents security posted with the Court 
by the Renter, Defendant, as the probable amount of costs of suit 
and actual damages that may result to the Owner (Plaintiff) if 
Plaintiff has improperly withheld possession of the premises 
located at: 215 SOUTH STATE STREET SUITE 401, SALT LAKE CITY UTAH 
84111-2354. 
PROPERTY BOND 
We the undersigned, G. Richard Kasteler, and Mary L. Daines, 
are residents of Salt Lake and Davis County, respectively, State 
of Utah, and we each own property in the property in the State of 
C:\WPDOCS\I\msurite v pa rks ide .7 .wpd 
Utah. We jointly and severally undertake the obligation of this 
bond in the sum of $ 25,000*00, and we shall pay all costs and 
damages which may be awarded to the Owner, not exceeding the sum 
undertaken. We state that each of us has a net worth, above 
debts, more than the sum undertaken; and we pledge the property 
listed herein as security in the above entitled action. 
C:\WPDOCS\I\msurite v parkside. ~* .wpd 2 
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SURETY NO,: 1 
RENTER'S COUNTER BOND 
Case No.: 98 09 06982 
1. Location of real property being pledged to execute this 
bond: 1210 East Millbrook Way, Bountiful, Utah 84010. 
2. Names of any others that have an ownership interest in the 
property: None 
3. Detailed description of the property: A house dwelling with 
necessary appurtenant facilities; for legal description see 
attached exhibit MAA\ 
4. Liens presently against property: A sum not in excess of 
$100,900.00. 
5. Fair market value of property: $383,000.00 
6. Total amount of outstanding bonds for which property is 
presently being pledged as security: $ None, other than the 
pledge for the within security. 
Mary/L. Dames 
1210 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 84 010 
Tele: 801.295-5072 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
The foregoing ins t rument was /acknc 
t h i s 12 th day of August, 1998, by Mary f > D a / 
he r eo f . 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
rledged before m^  
t h e signer^ 
FARY, 
S a l t 
, Residu^g i n 
e ^Count £,. . iitab. — ——-• 
mmmm — — —
 N o t a r y PgbliC J 
NICK J. COIESS1DES I 
466 South 400 East | 
Salt Lake City, Utah B4111 . 
My Commission Expires J 
February 23, 19D9 1 
State of Utah J 
C:\WPDOCS\I\insurite v p a r k s i d e . ? -uroci 
SURETY NO,: 2 
RENTER'S COUNTER BOND 
Case No.: 98 09 06982 
1. Location of real property being pledged to execute this 
bond: 6278 South Granada Drive, Salt Lake City, Utah 84121. 
2. Names of any others that have an ownership interest in the 
property: None 
3. Detailed description of the property: A house dwelling with 
necessary appurtenant facilities, located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah; for legal description see attached exhibit 
"BB\ 
4. Liens presently against property: A sum not in excess of 
$198,000.00 
5. Fair market value of property: $275,000.00 
6. Total amount of outstanding bonds for which property is 
presently being pledged as security: $ None, other than the 
pledge for the within security. 
G. Richard Ka&teler 
6278 South Granada Drive 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121 
Tele: 801.531-0731 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
ss 
) 
^ The foregoing instrument was ackn 
Richer this 12
th
 day of August, 1998, by G ~-
hereof. 
My Commission Expires: 
before me 
gner 
C:\WPDOCS\I\insurjte v parkside .7 .wpd 
JOTARY I^BLIC, R e s i d i n i j j i — 
salt Lakft-eoMirty^BS^Socs i 
r ^ ^ X NICK J. COUESStDff j 
Salt Lake Cityv L , 
February 23 1 9 ^ 
State of U t a h ^ ^ , J 
oomi 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
Mailed a copy of the foregoing Renter's Counter Bond 
to: 
MR ROBERT L STOLEBARGER ESQ 
MR GREGORY J SAVAGE ESQ 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
111 EAST BROADWAY, SUITE 1100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
via the United States Postal Service, postage prepaid, first 
class mail, this /^"day of August, 1998. 
C \WPDOCS\I\insunte v Dar kside.'7 .^ pd 5 
£y#ifr rf ^A 
if 
Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a 
point South 89 deg. 49 rain West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 
min West 1160.01 feet from the East Quarter corner of Section 
29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt LaJce Meridian, in the 
City of Bountiful, and running thence South 0 deg- 08 min. West 
159.99 feet to the South line of the Northeast Quarter of the 
Southeast Quarter of said Section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 
min. West 103.37 feet; thence North 0 Deg. 08 min- East 171.83 
feet to said street at a point on a 325 foot radius curve to the 
left; thence along said curve for an arch distance of 86.98 feet 
along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the point of 
beginning 
00 
fom* "££ // 
Sidvp'l No.: 22-21-231-009 
Unit No. 8 in Block B. of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a Condominiurn 
Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed for record 
as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, together 
with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the "Common 
Areas 3nd Facilities* of Monre Cristo Phase [, II, [II, *r)d IV 
as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a 
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached 
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in Book 3727 at 
pages 173 through 178 of Official Records. Said Common Areas 
and Facilities being set forth and defined by the original 
Declaration filed for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 
at page 144 through 182 of Official Records, and the First, 
Second, Third and Fourth Amendments thereto. 
& 6 1 2 1 7 0 
04^04/97 3:37 PH 1 4 . 0 0 
N A N C Y WORKMAN 
RECORDER* SALT LAKE COUNTY* UTAH 
SALT LAKE TITLE 






When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 11 p 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 




INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ; 
Defendant ] 
) LIS PENDENS 
I Civil No. 980906982 
i Judge Steven L. Henriod 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of the above-entitled action concerning title to 
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit"A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the 
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the 
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30,1998, the Court 
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has 
i/w.»v _ _ _ _ ^ . m u g mq 
i.cquesl of — — — _ _ 
Nancy Workman. Recorder 
Salt lake County. Utah 
i S/ .
 m Deputy 
#66874 
00014 
since awarded money damages in the amount of $108,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
costs to the Plaintiff Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
DATED this ^ L day of March, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 




STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this (ft day of March, 1999, by 
Matthew N. Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff 
/£p£l*X* Notary Pubiic^""! 
i $ l 3 ^ BEBHA BOWMAN , 
l^tl£xA iH ^ l ^ 3 5 1 Broadway. Suite 1100 I 
f \X vEz-3 /** S9kUke c,t* Utaf» w m . 
* x \ K O > - » 5 / - ^Convussion Expires I 




Sidwell No.: 22-21-231-009 
Unit No. 8 in Block B, of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a 
Condominium Project, according to the Record of Survey Map filed 
for record as Entry No. 2559805 in Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, 
together with the appurtenant undivided ownership interest in the 
"Common Areas and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase I, II, III, and 
IV as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of 
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a 
Condominium Project and the Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached 
thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 2665379 in Book 3727 at pages 
173 through 178 of Official Records. Said Common Areas and 
Facilities being set forth and defined by the original Declaration filed 
for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 at page 144 through 
182 of Official Records, and the First, Second, Third and Fourth 
Amendments thereto. 
#66874 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that 1 caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this ffiday of March, 1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
G. Richard Kasteler 
6278 South Granada Drive 




When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 




INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, } 
Defendant. ] 
) LIS PENDENS 
) Civil No. 980906982 
i Judge Steven L. Henriod 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN: 
You are hereby advised of the pendency of (he above-entitled action concerning title to 
certain real property situated in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that is more particularly 
described in Exhibit "A" attached hereto. 
This is an unlawful detainer action. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-8.5 the 
Defendant Insure-Rite Inc. filed a counterpossession property bond and filed as security for the 
property bond the property described in Exhibit "A". On November 30,1998, the Court 
determined that Insure-Rite had improperly withheld possession of the leased premises and has 
»668?| 
00020 
Date, Time M, 
iiequesi of . 
Nan^y Workman. Recorder 
Salt LcKe County, man 
S Sy Deputy 
since awarded money damages in the amount of SI 08,417.24, plus interest, attorney's fees and 
costs to the Plaintiff Plaintiff therefore may satisfy judgment through obtaining title to the 
property described in Exhibit "A". 
DATED this yV day of March, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this fiT\ day of March, 1999, by 
Matthew R Evans on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owenixp, Attorneys for Plaintiff. 
ifda 
Notary Public ~fc 
DEBRA BOWMAN , 
H I East Broadway. Surte IT00 I 





Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a point 
South 89 deg. 49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 min West 
1160.01 feet from the East Quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2 
North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, in the City of Bountiful, 
and running thence South 0 deg. 08 min. West 159.99 feet to the 
South line of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of said 
section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 min. West 103.37 feet; thence 
North 0 deg. 08 min. East 171.83 feet to said street at a point on a 325 
foot radius curve to the left; thence along said curve for an arch 
distance of 86.98 feet along said street; thence East 17.45 feet to the 
point of beginning 
#66871 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I cenify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing LIS PENDENS to the following this ffiday of March, 1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mary L. Daines 
1210 East Millbrook Way 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
»66S7I 4 C0023 
TabG 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801)521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 





INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF 
) JUDGMENT 
1 Civil No. 980906982 
I Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation ("Parkside'1) acknowledges partial satisfaction of 
that certain judgment in favor of Parkside, and against Insure-Rite Inc. ("Insure-Rite"), 
Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, dated and entered March 26, 1999, in the amount of 
$108,417.24, and designated as Judgment No. 1. This amount constitutes damages awarded to 
Parkside for the fair market rental value of the leased space unlawfully occupied by Insure-Rite 
trebled pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-36-10. Parkside directs the clerk of the above-entitled 
Court to release of record that portion of Judgment No.l that has been satisfied as acknowledged 
herein. 
00113 
This partial satisfaction of judgment does not effect Parkside's right to collect reasonable 
attorneys' fees, court costs and interest which the Court has awarded to Parkside in said 
Judgment No. 1. 
DATED this HfK day of June, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
By_i_ /:"'7/ .. : J. 
/ Greggory'X S a v'age / / 
MattheW N: Evans / 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
.isj/t The foregoing instrument was SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J£_ day
of June, 1999, by Greggory J. Savage, the signer hereof. 
"Notary Public I 
OEBRA BOWMAN , 
$ ;11 East Broadway, Suite 1100 I 
Salt lake City. Utah 84111 -
My Commission Expires | 
January 18.2003 
#68434 - 2 - 00119 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing PARTIAL SATISFACTION OF JUDGMENT to the following this J_ day of June, 
1999 to the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
John T. Giannopoulos 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
S6S-434 - 3 -
AA1 on 
TabH 
r-ir r P * -^ 
FILED _ r 
-r n HMO f 
Served 
_ iyp i ! * - l i ' " Time /i/c//? 
Uu 6,0^5^ 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J, Savage (5988) ~c~T 
Matthew N. Evans (7051) 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 




rof_Con_siaoie. Coiiins 461 -0234 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
















WRIT OF GARNISHMENT 
(Non-Wage) 
Civil No. 980906982 
Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Zions First National Bank. 
You are hereby ordered and commanded by the Court to hold, until further order of this 
Court, and not pay to Insure-Rite, Inc. any money or other personal property in your possession 
or under your control, whether now due or hereafter to become due, which are not exempt from 
execution, up to the amount remaining due on the judgment or order plus court approved costs in 
this matter, being not less than $33,001.56. 
You are required to answer the attached Interrogatories and file your answer with the 
Clerk of the Court within five (5) business days of the date this Writ is served upon you. The 
#71866 
00122 
address of the Clerk is: The Third Judicial District Court. 450 S. State Street. Salt Lake City: I IT 
8411 r. You are also required to send a copy of your Interrogatory answers to Plaintiffs' counsel 
at the following address: 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
111 East Broadway, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
If you fail to answer the Interrogatories, the judgment creditor may ask the Court to make 
you pay the amount you should have withheld. 
If you are indebted to or hold property or money belonging to Insure-Rite, Inc. which is 
subject to this Writ, you shall immediately mail by first class mail a copy of the Writ of 
Garnishment and your answer to the Interrogatories, the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions 
and two (2) copies of the Request for Hearing to Insure-Rite, Inc. at their last known address 
shown on your records at the time of the service of this Writ. In lieu of mailings, you may hand-
deliver a copy of these documents to Insure-Rite, Inc. 
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Insure-Rite, Inc.'s 
property or money to be held as shown by your answers. You will then be relieved from further 
liability in this case unless your answers are successfully disputed. You may, in the alternative, 
hold the money or property until further order of the Court. 
#71866 2 00123 
If you do not receive an order from the Court regarding this Writ and the property you 
held pursuant to this Writ within sixty (6'0) days after filing your answers to the attached 
interrogatories, this Writ shall expire and you may ignore it. 
DATED this <Zd) day of July, 1999. 
CLERK OF THE COURT 
By:_ acou 
DEPUTY CLERK 
• • • • - • . ' : . ' > \ \ 
, s' (-''surf. '•..-."* v#' 
S71866 3 
n n 1 o A 
CONSTABLE SUSAN COLLINS 
1492 South State Street, S.L. C. UT 84111 
461-0234 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
(GARNISHMENT/GARNISHEE ORDER) 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP Plaintiff ) 
v ) CASE #: 980906982 
INSURE-RITE, INC Defendant ) 
I HEREBY MAKE RETURN OF SERVICE AND CERTIFY: 
1) I am a duly qualified and acting peace officer in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, or am a person over the age of 18 at the time of this 
service, and not a party to this action. 
2) I received this GARNISHMENT, INTERR, $10.00 
on the date of 07/30/99 and served same upon the Garnishee listed 
below by leaving, at the address(s) and on the date(s) shown below, 
a copy with the Garnishee, Garnishee's agent for service or payroll 
officer of the Garnishee, to whom I also showed the original. 
3) Upon serving the same, I endorsed the date and place of service and m^  
name on the copy served. 
Garnishee: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
I Served: ALLISON ROBISON, GARNISHE 
On the date of: 07-30-99 Time: 14:40 






# of Trips: 1 
Total Miles: 1 
nm 9^ 
Constable Susan Collins 
Deputy TODD ORAM SL59D 
Tab I 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J Savage (5988) 
Matthew N Evans (7051) 
111 East Bioadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone. (801)521-5800 
Facsimile: (801)521-9639 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




INSURE-RITE, INC., " 
Defendant. ' 
I WRIT OF GARNISHMENT 
1 (Non-Wage) 
i Civil No. 980906982 
i Judge Stephen L. Henroid 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO: Zions First National Bank. 
You are hereby ordered and commanded by the Court to hold, until further order of this 
Court, and not pay to Insure-Rite, Inc. any money or other personal property in your possession 
or under your control, whether now due or hereafter to become due, which are not exempt from 
execution, up to the amount remaining due on the judgment or order plus court approved costs in 
this matter, being not less than $14,500.00. 
You are required to answer the attached Interrogatories and file your answer with the 




y- ? y^y^ -
address of the Clerk is: The Third Judicial District Court, 450 S. State Street, Salt Lake City, UT 
MULL You are also required to send a copy of your Interrogatory answers to Plaintiffs' counsel 
at the following address: 
Greggory J. Savage 
Matthew N. Evans 
Holme Roberts & Owen, LLP 
111 East Broadway, #1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
If you fail to answer the Interrogatories, the judgment creditor may ask the Court to make 
you pay the amount you should have withheld. 
If you are indebted to or hold property or money belonging to Insure-Rite, Inc. which is 
subject to this Writ, you shall immediately mail by first class mail a copy of the Writ of 
Garnishment and your answer to the Interrogatories, the Notice of Garnishment and Exemptions 
and two (2) copies of the Request for Hearing to Insure-Rite, Inc. at their last known address 
shown on your records at the time of the service of this Writ. In lieu of mailings, you may hand-
deliver a copy of these documents to Insure-Rite, Inc. 
YOU MAY DELIVER to the officer serving this Writ the portion of Insure-Rite, Inc/s 
property or money to be held as shown by your answers. You will then be relieved from further 
liability in this case unless your answers are successfully disputed. You may, in the alternative, 
hold the money or property until further order of the Court. 
#70801 2 00128 
If you do not leceive an oidei fiom the Court tegarding this Win and the piopcrty \ou 
held pursuant to this Writ within sixty (60) days after filing your answers to the attached 
intenogatories, this Wat shall expire and you may ignoie it 
DATED this ^fJ day of June, 1999. 
CLERK OF THiySQLQJJ 
^EFtJWjgfcERK .' i"" 
inosoi 3 00129 
CONSTABLE SUSAN COLLINS 
1492 South State Street, S.L. C. UT 84111 
461-0234 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
(GARNISHMENT/GARNISHEE ORDER) 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE CORP Plaintiff ) 
v ) CASE #: 980906982 
INSURE-RITE, INC Defendant ) 
I HEREBY MAKE RETURN OF SERVICE AND CERTIFY: 
1) I am a duly qualified and acting peace officer in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, or am a person over the age of 18 at the time of this 
service, and not a party to this action. 
2) I received this GARNISHMENT, INTERR, $10.00 
on the date of 06/30/99 and served same upon the Garnishee listed 
below by leaving, at the address(s) and on the date(s) shown below, 
a copy with the Garnishee, Garnishee's agent for service or payroll 
officer of the Garnishee, to whom I also showed the original. 
3) Upon serving the same, I endorsed the date and place of service and m 
name on the copy served. 
Garnishee: ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
I Served: JULIE MEADOWS, GARNISHEE 
On the date of: 06-30-99 Time: 16:45 
At the address of: 10 E SOUTH TEMPLE ST #500, SLC U , 
Constable Susan Collins 
: ^C*£ ^J &**"—-






# of Trips: 1 





5/01/1999 04:*3 ^ 1 6 = OO 
When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage,. #5988 
Matthew N.Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS 
Civil No. 980906982 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
On or about March 29,1999, plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation filed a lis pendens, 
recorded as Entry No. 7304439 in Book 8262, Page 7913 of the official records of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, by and through its counsel, 








DATED this f d - day of September, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
'Greggory J./^avage' 
Matthejv N. Evans ; 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:s 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) :ss. 
^ r 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this ' day of September, 1999, 
by Greggory J. Savage on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, counsel for Plaintiff Parkside 
Salt Lake Corporation. 
r ° M i^n JO ems 
( COOS *8l Aienuer seitdxg uotssiiuuioo fyi 
I 00 U ejms 'AsMpcojg jscg \ n 
1
 NVWM03 VU83Q 
jtM^y^m '4J£=^ 
Notary Public 






CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS to the following this J_ day of September, 1999 to 
the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Mary L. Daines 
1210 East Millbrook Way 












Beginning on the South line of a street (Millbrook Way) at a point South 89 deg. 
49 min West 661.41 feet and South 0 deg. 08 min West 1160.01 feet from the 
East Quarter corner of Section 29, Township 2 North, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Meridian, in the City of Bountiful, and running thence South 0 deg. 08 min. West 
159.99 feet to the South line of the Northeast Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of 
said section 29; thence South 89 deg. 51 min. West 103.37 feet; thence North 0 
deg. 08 min. East 171.83 feet to said street at a point on a 325 foot radius curve to 
the left; thence along said curve for an arch distance of 86.98 feet along said 












When Recorded Please Return To: 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
Greggory J. Savage, #5988 
Matthew N. Evans, #7051 
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-5800 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
PARKSIDE SALT LAKE 
CORPORATION, a Delaware 
corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
INSURE-RITE, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendant. 
RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS 
Civil No. 980906982 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
On or about March 29,1999, plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation filed a lis pendens, 
recorded as Entry No. 7304440 in Book 8262, Page 7917 of the official records of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Plaintiff Parkside Salt Lake Corporation, by and through its counsel, 













DATED this Jgt. day of September, 1999. 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN LLP 
.--—•/ Bv r1/^ ... M L 
Greggbry/f. Savage / 
VISK: 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ) 
The foregoing instrument was acknowledged before me this / day of September, 1999, 
by Greggory J. Savage on behalf of Holme Roberts & Owen LLP, Attorneys for Plaintiff Parkside 
Salt Lake Corporation. 
"1: Notary Public 
*A DEBRA BOWMAN . 
Vol .'11 East Broadway, Sun© 1100 I 
fej Sah Lake Crty, Utah 64111 . 
My Commission Exp^es § 
January 18,2003 
SUte. of Utah j 










nm A o 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused to be mailed via First Class, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid the 
foregoing RELEASE OF LIS PENDENS to the following this [_ day of September, 1999 to 
the following: 
Nick J. Colessides 
466 South 400 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-3325 
John E.S. Robson 
Fabian & Clendenin 
215 South State, #1200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
G. Richard Kasteler 
6278 South Granada Drive 











Sidwell No.: 22-21-231-009 
Unit No. 8 in Block B, of MONTE CRISTO PHASE I, a Condominium Project, 
according to the Record of Survey Map filed for record as Entry No. 2559805 in 
Book 73-8 of Plats at Page 56, together with the appurtenant undivided ownership 
interest in the "Common Areas and Facilities" of Monte Cristo Phase I, II, III, and 
IV as set forth in the Fourth Amendment To The Declaration of Covenants, 
Conditions and Restrictions of Monte Cristo, a Condominium Project and the 
Final Amended Exhibit "B" attached thereto, filed for record as Entry No. 
2665379 in Book 3727 at pages 173 through 178 of Official Records. Said 
Common Areas and Facilities being set forth and defined by the original 
Declaration filed for record as Entry No. 2559806 in Book 3389 at page 144 












931 F.2d 900 (Table) 
Unpublished Disposition 




THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
(The Court's decision is referenced in a 
"Table of Decisions Without Reported 
Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter. 
Use FI CTA10 Rule 36.3 for rules regarding 
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UTAH COUNTY, Jeril Wilson, Lynn W. 
Davis, Defendants-Appellees. 
No. 88-2384. 
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit. 
April 29,1991. 
D. Utah, No. C-83-0736W. 
D.Utah 
AFFIRMED. 
Before SEYMOUR and BALDOCK, Circuit 
Judges, and THEIS, District Judge. [FN*] 
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN**] 
SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge. 
**1 J. Walter Fitzgerald, Betty M. Fitzgerald, 
Printess K. Fitzgerald, and Jenence Fitzgerald 
(the Fitzgeralds) brought this action pursuant 
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) and state law 
against Utah County and its employees and 
agents asserting claims arising out of 
enforcement of the County's zoning 
ordinances. The critical facts underlying the 
action are the Fitzgeralds' failure to obtain a 
waiver under a County regulation of otherwise 
applicable zoning requirements, and the 
publicizing of their noncompliance with those 
ordinances. The Fitzgeralds sold or attempted 
to sell land zoned for agricultural use to 
buyers who believed that they would 
ultimately be able to use the property for 
residential purposes. The Fitzgeralds alleged 
that when the County refused to approve the 
waiver and publicized the Fitzgeralds' failure 
to comply with the zoning regulations, buyers 
who had already entered into purchase 
contracts stopped paying on those contracts 
and potential sales were lost. 
The Fitzgeralds challenged the validity of the 
Utah County ordinances on several grounds. 
In addition, they contended that the zoning 
regulations constituted a taking of their 
property in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments, claimed that 
defendants' alleged defamatory statements 
deprived them of their property interests in 
either their realty or realty contracts without 
due process, and asserted a state law claim for 
slander of title based on the filing of a lis 
pendens. Defendants moved for summary 
judgment. The district court referred the 
matter to a magistrate, who issued a report 
recommending that summary judgment be 
granted to all defendants except Utah County, 
deputy County attorney Lynn Davis, and Utah 
County Commissioner Jeril Wilson. The 
report recommended that only two of 
plaintiffs' claims be allowed to go forward: 
the defamatory-injury-to-property claim 
against all three remaining defendants, and 
the slander-of-title claim against defendants 
Utah County and Lynn Davis. The district 
court accepted the report except for the 
recommendation relating to the slander-of-
title claim. The court rejected the 
recommendation that this claim remain in the 
suit, concluding instead that it was barred by 
the applicable statute of limitations. The 
district court held two evidentiary hearings on 
the remaining defamatory-injury-to-property 
claim, and then granted defendants' motion to 
dismiss. The Fitzgeralds appeal and we 
affirm. 
I. 
Under Utah County zoning ordinances 
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promulgated pursuant to state zoning statutes, 
a subdivision plan or plat cannot be recorded 
until approved by the county planning 
commission, and no land located within a 
subdivision can be sold until the plat has been 
recorded. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-27-21 
(1987 replacement); Utah County Ordinance 
4-3-52 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. 
B). Under state law, a subdivision is defined 
as "the division of a tract, or lot or parcel of 
land into three or more lots, plats, sites or 
other divisions of land for the purpose ... of 
sale or of building development." Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-27-27. This definition specifically 
excludes "a bona fide division or partition of 
agricultural land for agricultural purposes." 
Id. Thus, unlike a tract of land that is divided 
and sold for residential purposes, the division 
of an agricultural tract need not be approved 
and recorded prior to sale. In conjunction with 
the above regulations, Utah County enacted 
the zoning ordinance at issue, under which a 
property owner who wants to divide and sell 
agricultural land without recording a plat 
must obtain a waiver from the County 
Building Inspector. The waiver requires the 
recordation of deed covenants precluding 
residential or other non-agricultural use of the 
land. See Utah County Ordinance § 4-3-53 
(Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. B). 
**2 The Fitzgeralds divided and sold 
agricultural land without recording the plat. 
They assert on appeal that these divisions 
were to be used as small farmsteads, and 
therefore recording the plat was unnecessary. 
However, they also failed to obtain the 
required waivers because apparently not all 
the purchasers were willing to execute 
covenants precluding residential use. The 
record reflects that at least some of the 
purchasers expected that the land would be 
rezoned to permit residential use in the future. 
The Fitzgeralds first assert that the 
ordinances are invalid and void, and 
administered unconstitutionally. We have 
carefully reviewed the analysis and 
authorities addressing these claims in the 
magistrate's report, which the district court 
adopted. We are in substantial agreement 
with the disposition of these issues as set out 
Copr. © West 1999 No Claim 
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The Fitzgeralds also contend that the 
ordinances constitute a taking of their 
property without just compensation in 
violation of the Fifth Amendment. The law is 
clear that such a claim is not ripe until all 
administrative avenues for review of the 
unfavorable zoning decision have been 
exhausted and state procedures for obtaining 
just compensation have been utilized. See 
Williamson Co. Regional Planning Comm'n v. 
Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186-87 (1985); 
Landmark Land Co. of Oklahoma, Inc. v. 
Buchanan, 874 F.2d 717, 721 (10th Cir.1989). 
Here, state law provides an appeal to the 
board of adjustment for persons aggrieved by a 
decision made in the course of administering 
or enforcing zoning regulations. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 17-27-16. The Fitzgeralds have 
not pursued their claims with the board of 
adjustment, nor have they demonstrated that 
an appeal would be futile or that the decision 
at issue is otherwise final. Moreoever, and of 
equal significance, the Fitzgeralds have not 
established that they pursued state procedures 
for obtaining just compensation. Accordingly, 
their taking claim is premature. 
a 
The Fitzgeralds also appeal the district 
court's dismissal of their claim alleging that 
defendants deprived them of their property 
interest without due process by issuing 
defamatory statements. The district court 
held two hearings to enable the Fitzgeralds to 
present evidence on this claim to raise a fact 
issue in opposition to defendants' motion for 
summary judgment. At the second hearing, 
plaintiffs proffered evidence describing the 
testimony that would be presented at trial by 
people who bought land from plaintiffs 
believing that the land would be rezoned for 
residential use. These buyers allegedly 
stopped paying on their contracts when they 
learned that the land would not be rezoned. 
We agree with the district court that this 
evidence, taken as true, does not support a 
constitutional claim. The Due Process Clause 
mandates the procedures necessary to provide 
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defamed persons an opportunity to clear their 
names by allowing them to establish that the 
defamatory statements are false. See Codd v. 
Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 627 (1977) (per curiam). 
Thus, only when "a false and defamatory 
impression" is created and disseminated is a 
hearing mandated. Id. at 628; Melton v. City 
of Oklahoma City, - F.2d , - - , No. 85-1758, 
slip op. at 19-21 (10th Cir. March 19, 1991) (en 
banc). Assuming that a defamatory injury to 
property without due process could under some 
circumstances state a claim for relief under 
section 1983, plaintiffs have failed to establish 
an essential element of such a claim. 
Plaintiffs' proffered evidence, viewed most 
favorably to them, showed that the buyers 
who stopped paying on their contracts did so 
because defendants' statements led them to 
believe that their property could never legally 
be used for residential purposes. As the 
district court observed, the statements to this 
effect attributed to defendants were not 
defamatory because they were true. 
**3 Plaintiffs asserted below and on appeal 
that the defamatory statements included 
allegations that their land sales were illegal, 
which they vehemently deny. Plaintiffs' own 
proffered evidence, however, shows that their 
damages were not caused by the charges of 
illegal sales. Instead, their buyers were 
influenced to stop payment on their contracts 
by statements that residential use of the land 
would never be allowed. Moreover, as set out 
in Part I, supra, it appears from the record 
that plaintiffs' sales were in fact illegal. It is 
undisputed that plaintiffs did not obtain the 
waiver from the County Building Inspector 
required to subdivide and sell agricultural 
land without recording a plat, nor did they 
record their plat. 
"Any sale or other transfer of land into three 
or more parcels without the owner or agent of 
the owner first having obtained a signed 
waiver from the Building Inspector, or having 
recorded an approved subdivision plat, shall 
be considered prima facie evidence of the 
illegal subdivision of land and a violation of 
this section and Section 4-3-52 of this 
ordinance, subject to the penalties stated 
therein." 
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Utah County Ordinance § 4-3-53 (Addendum 
to Brief of Appellants, doc. B). Section 4-3-52 
provides that one who sells property within an 
unrecorded and unapproved subdivision is 
guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to civil 
remedies. See Utah County Ordinance § 4-3-
52 (Addendum to Brief of Appellants, doc. B). 
Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
disposition of plaintiffs' claim for defamatory 
injury to property without due process. We do 
not address the state law claims asserting 
interference with contractual relations 
because they are raised for the first time on 
appeal. 
m. 
Finally, we affirm the dismissal of the 
Fitzgeralds' slander-of-title claim, albeit on 
grounds different from those relied on by the 
district court. This state law cause of action 
was based on a lis pendens covering the 
property at issue recorded in connection with 
the filing of a lawsuit by Utah County. The 
lawsuit challenged unrecorded land sales 
similar to the sales made by the Fitzgeralds, 
although they were not named defendants in 
that suit. 
This claim fails on two equally dispositive 
grounds. First, Utah holds that the recording 
of a lis pendens is privileged and therefore 
cannot support a claim for slander of title. See 
Hansen v. Kohler, 550 P.2d 186, 189-90 (Utah 
1976). 
"[S]ince the effect of a lis pendens is to give 
constructive notice of all the facts apparent on 
the face of the pleadings, the recordation of a 
notice of lis pendens is, in effect, a 
republication of the pleadings. Since the 
publication of the pleadings is absolutely 
privileged, the republication thereof by 
recording a notice of lis pendens is similarly 
privileged." 
Id. at 190. The instant case is distinguishable 
from Birch v. Fuller, 9 Utah 2d 79, 337 P.2d 
964 (1959), upon which the Fitzgeralds rely, 
because in Birch no underlying action was 
filed. Here, as in Hansen, an underlying 
lawsuit was filed. Although plaintiffs argue 
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that Hansen is not controlling because they 
were not named in the suit, we conclude that 
this fact is not significant. The decision in 
Hansen was based on the Court's holding that 
a lis pendens is privileged because it merely 
republishes the pleadings, which are 
themselves privileged. The lis pendens here 
thus derives its privilege from the action it 
republishes. In Birch, to the contrary, the lis 
pendens did not republish an underlying 
privileged pleading. 
**4 In addition, under Utah law, a slander of 
title action requires proof of special damages 
"by evidence of a lost sale or the loss of some 
other pecuniary advantage." Bass v. Planned 
Management Serv., 761 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 
1988). Damages may not be presumed. Id. 
The Fitzgeralds have proffered no evidence of 
the requisite specific monetary loss due to the 
filing of the lis pendens. Accordingly, we 
affirm the ruling against the Fitzgeralds on 
this cause of action. 
AFFIRMED. 
FN* Honorable Frank G. Theis, United States 
Senior District Judge for the District of Kansas, 
sitting by designation. 
FN** This order and judgment has no precedential 
value and shall not be cited, or used by any court 
within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of 
establishing the doctrines of the law of the case, res 
judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10th Cir.R. 36.3. 
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